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Introduction  
 
In recent years, the phenomenon of suicide bombings has become a topic of particular 
importance to terrorism analysts, psychologists, government officials, and parts of the general 
public in various regions of the world. Following the horrendous wave of suicide attacks that 
shook the United States on September 11, 2001, attention to this rather understudied 
phenomenon is likely to increase.  
Since the 1980s, when Lebanon became the stage for several spectacular suicide terrorist 
attacks, this modus operandi has spread to a host of other countries, including Sri Lanka, Turkey, 
India, Pakistan, and other places as inconspicuous as Panama and Tanzania. However, few 
countries are more familiar with this tactic and its devastating consequences than the state of 
Israel.  
Between 1993 and mid-April 2002, at least 128 Palestinian suicide bombers have 
detonated themselves in the vicinity of Israeli civilians or soldiers.
1 Roughly half of these suicide 
attacks have occurred during the Second Intifada, which erupted in late September 2000.
2 Since 
this latest round of violence and until April 12, 2002, at least 188 Israelis were killed, and over 
1,800 wounded in suicide attacks.
3 By April 12, roughly 40% of the Israelis “killed by 
Palestinian violence and terrorism since September 2000” were killed in suicide terrorist 
attacks.
4 
                                                 
1 See Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, April 15, 2002, http://www.mfa.gov.il/ 
2 See Amos Harel, “The 100
th Suicide Bomber,” Ha’aretz (On-line Edition), October 10, 2001. The statistics 
reported in this article should be viewed in conjunction with the updated statistics of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/ 
3 See Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, April 15, 2002. Additional statistics on Israeli victims are 
available at the websites of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), http://www.idf.il/, and the website of B’Tselem, the 
Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories at http://www.btselem.org/  
4 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
Suicide Bombings in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Conceptual Framework 
 Assaf Moghadam                                                                      Page 4 
  In academic literature, the phenomenon of suicide bombings has not enjoyed large 
prominence to date,
5 and only a handful of scholarly articles have been published on the subject 
at the time of this writing. Most studies on suicide terrorism concern themselves with particular 
aspects of suicide terrorism, such as religious, cultural, or psychological considerations of the 
phenomenon. Little efforts have been made thus far to devise an analytical framework for 
understanding the processes and factors that underlie the development of the suicide bomber and 
the execution of suicide bombing attacks. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap.  
The analytical framework offered here is an attempt to provide an overall model for a 
better understanding of the underlying motivations of Palestinian suicide bombers on the one 
hand, and the process in which suicide bombings are executed on the other hand. The model 
assumes that such an attack is the result of a two-phase process. Broadly speaking, this model 
first traces the underlying motives that drive organizations and individuals to perpetrate acts of 
suicide terrorism. It then shows how, following the recruitment of the suicide candidate, 
organizations train and indoctrinate him or her into a suicide bomber.  
While much of the data used in this paper is specific to Israel, the study may be helpful in 
explaining occurrences of suicide terrorism in other countries as well. It attempts to answer three 
central questions: (1) What instills individual Palestinians with a willingness to die, and which 
factors reinforce this mentality? (2) What motivates organizations such as Hamas, Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Fatah, and PFLP to organize suicide bombing attacks, and what are their 
goals? (3) What methods do these organizations use to mold motivated Palestinians who are 
                                                 
5 This apparent gap is more than likely to be filled in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001.  
Nevertheless, at the time of this writing, the only book that deals exclusively with the phenomenon of suicide 
terrorism is a collection of proceedings of an International Conference on Suicide Terrorism that was sponsored by 
the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya, Israel, on February 20-21, 2000. The 
book is titled Countering Suicide Terrorism: An International Conference (Herzliya, Israel: The International Policy 
Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel: 2001). 
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willing to die into actual suicide bombers, and how do organizations help plan and execute acts 
of suicide terrorism?  
The two major aims of this paper can therefore be summarized as follows: First, to offer a 
framework of analysis for understanding suicide terrorism as an individual and organizational 
phenomenon. Second, to apply this model to the case of suicide bombings by Palestinians during 
the Second Intifada.  
The study is structured as follows. Following the Introduction, Part I of the paper will 
present this new framework of analysis in more detail. It will also provide a brief overview of the 
phenomenon of suicide terrorism, offering a working definition of what may be understood as an 
act of suicide terrorism. Another section of Part I will look at the traditional profile of the suicide 
bomber and will argue that the concept of profiling should be reassessed.  
Part II will examine the set of motivations—religious, personal, nationalist, economic, 
sociological, and psychological—that likely play a role in generating and/or reinforcing the 
willingness to die of an individual Palestinian, which is the precondition for his selection as a 
‘martyr’. The argument will be made that it is a combination of motives among this “pool of 
personal motivations” that leads to and reinforces the readiness of some Palestinians to die.  
Part III of the study will focus on organizational aspects of Palestinian suicide terrorism, 
and consists of three sections. The first section will cover several concepts from organizational 
and group theory and argues their relevance to suicide terrorism. The next section will provide an 
overview over the four organizations that are responsible for the suicide bombings in the first 
eighteen months of the Second Intifada, from October 2000 until March 2002. The third section 
will first discuss tactical aspects of suicide terrorism, and will then take a closer look at several 
aspects for which organizations employing suicide terrorism are responsible: recruitment, 
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training, indoctrination, planning, and execution. The findings will then be summarized in a 
conclusion. 
 
Part I: Framework of Analysis 
Two-Phase Model of Suicide Bombings 
 
In the academic literature to date, the phenomenon of suicide terrorism has not received 
the attention it deserves. Of the rare studies conducted on this modus operandi, few have 
emphasized the need to consider both individual aspects (i.e., what motivates the volunteer for 
the suicide mission) as well as organizational aspects (i.e., organizational goals, and methods of 
training and indoctrination) of suicide terrorism.
6   
  The framework of analysis offered here assumes that suicide terrorism is both an 
individual and an organizational phenomenon; in fact, it will be assumed that both aspects are 
integral and necessary parts of the process in which suicide attacks are organized and executed, 
and hence should be included in any discussion on suicide terrorism. The Israeli-Palestinian case 
shows that an individual Palestinian who is motivated to become a suicide bomber lacks the 
resources, information, and probably the mental capacity needed to perpetrate such an act 
without the help of an organization. It is therefore not surprising that nearly all suicide bombings 
against Israeli targets are planned by a radical Palestinian organization.
7 At the same time, it is 
                                                 
6 Not all terrorism analysts agree on the importance of individual aspects of suicide terrorism. For example, Prof. 
Ariel Merari, a leading scholar on suicide bombings from Tel Aviv University, refers to suicide terrorism as an 
“organizational phenomenon.”  See lecture by Prof. Ariel Merari at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy on 
January 16, 2002, summarized in Assaf Moghadam, “Fletcher Hosts Ariel Merari, Israeli Expert on Suicide 
Terrorism,” Fletcher Ledger, February 4, 2002, available at http://www.fletcherledger.com/archive/2002-02-
04/020402-NfinalSuicideTerrorism.htm 
7 There are a few exceptions to this rule. In February 2001, for example, a 35-year old Palestinian bus driver overran 
and killed eight Israelis. In fact, in many suicide attacks for which no organization claimed responsibility, the 
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clear that under normal circumstances, organizations themselves do not supply the pool of ripe 
suicide bombers from among their own ranks, but rather recruit individuals who are ready to kill 
themselves while killing others. It should also be kept in mind that the sheer fact that 
organizational leaders rarely put their own lives (or those of their relatives) at risk suggests that a 
clear distinction needs to be drawn between individual motives on the one hand, and 
organizational goals and motives on the other.  
With this key assumption in mind, the framework of analysis offered here focuses on two 
sets of motives: those of the Palestinian individual, and those relating to organizations.
8 Motives 
from the individual realm may include, inter alia, such motives as the desire to reap expected 
benefits in the afterlife, or the urge to seek revenge for the death or injury of a close friend or 
family member. The second set, which defines those goals and motives that lead organizations to 
plan suicide attacks, includes political aims of and tactical considerations for the use of suicide 
bombings.  
These two sets of motives converge at the recruitment stage, when organizations identify 
and mobilize individuals who have professed a willingness to die. At this stage, the two 
necessary conditions for suicide bombings merge: on the one hand, a willingness to kill that may 
stem from individuals or from the organizations; and, on the other hand, a willingness to die 
among the individual who has been recruited. It is at the recruitment stage when the first phase, 
what I will term the ‘Motivational phase’, ends, and where the second phase, the Institutional 
Phase, sets in. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
attacker wore no explosive device on his body. It appears that save for extremely rare cases, an ordinary individual 
would usually lack the resources and know-how to produce explosive devices on his own. In addition, some 
organizations may deliberately forego claiming responsibility for an attack due to tactical reasons, whether to 
deceive the enemy, as a means of psychological warfare, or to hamper retaliatory attacks.  
8 It is assumed that some of these motives apply to both individuals and organizations. 
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During the ‘Institutional Phase’, the ‘volunteer for martyrdom’ comes entirely under the 
auspices of the organization. During this phase, the volunteer is indoctrinated and trained by the 
organization, which hones the individual who is ready to die into a highly committed ‘living 
martyr’. The goal of the organization at this phase is to take all measures necessary to assure the 
individual’s commitment to perpetrate the act—in fact, to morally bind the volunteer to his 
commitment and to make sure that he will not change his mind. To achieve this goal, the 
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organization, during this phase, will use several techniques that will include peptalks, group 
pressure, and the extrications of personal and public commitments that the candidate will find 
difficult, if not impossible, to turn back from.
9 Towards the end of this phase, the ‘volunteer for 
martyrdom’ reaches a point of no return, and becomes a ‘living martyr’.
10  This Institutional 
Phase, which usually stretches over a number of days, culminates in the execution of the actual 
suicide terrorism attack.   
 
Terrorism and Suicide Bombings 
The use of suicide attacks by terrorist groups is not a new phenomenon.
11 As Walter 
Laqueur points out, the medieval Assassins, most of the 19
th century anarchist terrorist 
operations, and the Russian Social Revolutionaries all employed suicide missions. Laqueur 
argues that “virtually all attacks against leading public figures in countries that have capital 
punishment are suicide missions.”
12  
Though Laqueur’s point seems well taken, an assessment of what kind of attack 
constitutes a suicide mission is more problematic than might seem at first glance. What, for 
instance, distinguishes the mental state of a soldier who marches toward an enemy army in a 
hopeless battle from that of the suicide bomber whose death is all but certain? Is there any 
                                                 
9 Lecture by Ariel Merari at the Fletcher School, in Assaf Moghadam, “Fletcher Hosts Ariel Merari, Israeli Expert 
on Suicide Terrorism,” Fletcher Ledger, February 4, 2002, available at http://www.fletcherledger.com/archive/2002-
02-04/020402-NfinalSuicideTerrorism.htm 
10 See Assaf Moghadam, “Fletcher Hosts Ariel Merari, Israeli Expert on Suicide Terrorism.”  
11 The tactical use of suicide attacks has not been confined to terrorist groups, but has also been employed by state 
actors. Toward the end of World War Two, for example, Japan employed the notorious kamikaze suicide pilots, who  
downed their airplanes on U.S. targets. 
12 Laqueur, Walter (ed.), The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 141. 
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connection between the self-starvation of IRA prisoners, or between self-immolating Buddhist 
monks on the one hand, and the suicide bomber on the other?  
The seeming lack of clarity with regard to defining an act of suicide terrorism has also 
occupied the Israeli defense establishment. As late as November 2001—over seven years after 
the first suicide attack on Israeli soil—the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Israel’s domestic 
intelligence services (known also by its Hebrew acronyms Shabak or Shin Bet) disagreed over 
how Palestinian suicide attacks should be counted. According to an Israeli news report, the Shin 
Bet abides by the traditional definition—that of an attacker who detonates a bomb strapped to his 
body—while the IDF has a broader understanding of the phenomenon. In its count, the IDF 
includes attacks in which the perpetrator stands virtually zero chance of survival. For this reason, 
a Palestinian gunmen on a shooting spree inside Israeli cities would usually be considered a 
suicide bomber by the IDF, but not by the Shin Bet.
13  
In this paper, two elements shall define a suicide mission: the willingness to kill, 
combined with the willingness to die. As far as the goals of suicide missions are concerned, it 
cannot be generalized that a sponsoring organization such as Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
(PIJ) will deem a suicide bombing more successful the more casualties it produces.
14 The 
‘success’ of a suicide mission will depend on a number of factors that are often difficult to 
measure, such as the effect on the targeted population, or the extent to which the attack generates 
international condemnation, and hence political pressure on the sponsoring organizations.
15 It 
will be a function of whether and how the Palestinian Authority (PA) will exert pressure against 
the sponsoring terrorist organizations, which in turn depends on political circumstances that are 
                                                 
13 Amos Harel, “IDF, Shin Bet Differ on Defining Suicide Attack,” Ha’aretz (On-Line Edition), November 30, 
2001. 
14 Author’s interview with Reuven Paz, Hertzliya, Israel, January 6, 2002. 
15 In the Palestinian case, political pressure would initially be exerted on the Palestinian Authority (PA). The PA 
may then decide to exert pressure on the organizations.  
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difficult to assess. Finally, it will depend also on the degree of media coverage the attack will 
elicit.  
Any successful attack will necessarily result in the death of the suicide bomber during the 
detonation of the bombing device at or near the target. It is unlikely that from a tactical point of 
view, the group that planned the suicide bombing will consider a premature explosion (i.e., 
before the suicide bomber has reached his target) a success.
16 Nevertheless, the suicide bomber 
will generally be considered a shaheed  (martyr) regardless of whether his device detonated 
prematurely or not, or whether Israeli forces managed to stop him before inflicting severe 
damage on his target.  
It is clear that the suicide bomber needs to be distinguished from an ordinary person who 
entertains suicidal tendencies. For the suicide bomber, it is not the determination to kill him or 
herself, but rather the determination to kill the enemy that is the driving force.
17 Second, unlike 
in a normal suicide, the suicide terrorist plan is typically prepared by others, not by the individual 
himself.
18 Third, unlike in an ordinary suicide, the suicide terrorist is ‘on call’ prior to the attack, 
oftentimes over a period of several weeks. One of the most extreme cases is that of September 11 
suicide pilot Muhammad Atta, who seems to have known of the attack on the World Trade 
Center months, if not years, in advance—an attack that involved his own death. Psychologists 
                                                 
16 For other definitions of suicide terrorists, compare definitions by Boaz Ganor, “Suicide Attacks in Israel,” in 
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Countering Suicide Terrorism: An International 
Conference (Herzliya, Israel: The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the Interdisciplinary 
Center, Herzliya, Israel: 2001), p. 134, and Yoram Schweitzer, “Suicide Terrorism: Development and Main 
Characteristics,” ICT, Countering Suicide Terrorism, p. 76.  
17 See Raphael Israeli, “Islamikaze and their Significance,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, No.3 (Autumn 
1997), p. 104. 
18 See, for example, Ariel Merari, Statement Submitted in Testimony before the Special Oversight Panel on 
Terrorism, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, July 13, 2000. Additional information 
about the nature of the planning of the September 11, 2001 attacks will be necessary in order to establish whether 
the suicide terrorists of those attacks may have posed an exception to this rule.   
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and terrorism experts are likely to focus on Atta’s considerable mental capabilities for many 
years to come, and may find it necessary to adjust the traditional profile of the suicide bomber.   
  
Profiling the Suicide Bomber  
The ‘Traditional’ Profile 
Ongoing attempts by Israeli psychologists and terrorism experts to map the profile of 
suicide bombers have garnered only mixed results. In fact, several terrorism experts discount the 
existence of one single profile, and speak instead of a variety of profiles.
19 Ariel Merari, an 
Israeli psychologist at Tel Aviv University, profiled a large number of suicide bombers serving 
in radical Arab or Islamic groups, and concluded that “no single psychological or demographic 
profile of suicide terrorists” exists.
20 Nevertheless, a large number of Palestinian suicide 
bombers from earlier waves of suicide bombings in Israel in the years between 1994 and 1997, 
as well as from the first eighteen months of the Second Intifada, turned out to have been in their 
early twenties, single, unemployed, and from lower socio-economic strata. They had usually 
completed high school, and had sometimes enrolled in college. The average age of the 
Palestinian suicide bomber in late August 2001 was twenty-one, and the tendency was for their 
average age to fall.
21 Many suicide bombers were deeply pious, devoted students in religious 
centers funded by Islamist groups such as Hamas or PIJ. It is also a fact that some friends and 
family members of individual perpetrators had been killed or injured while fighting Israeli 
security forces, as has been revealed either by the suicide bombers themselves (for example, 
                                                 
19 Author’s interviews with Anat Kurz, Tel Aviv, Israel, January 7, 2002, and Yoram Schweitzer, Hertzliya, January 
8, 2002. 
20 See Ehud Sprinzak, “Rational Fanatics,” Foreign Policy, September/October 2000, p. 68. 
21 See “Profile of a Suicide Bomber: Single Male, Average Age – 21”, Ha’aretz (On-Line Edition), August 24, 
2001. 
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through letters or videotapes left behind) or by their relatives and friends. These suicide bombers, 
it seemed, were raised in an atmosphere of conflict.  
Reappraising the Profile of the Suicide Bomber 
Events since 2001 have rendered the already problematic effort of profiling the 
Palestinian suicide bomber even less clear-cut, and these problems are also apparent with regard 
to establishing a general profile of all suicide terrorists.  
In February 2001, a 35-year old Palestinian bus driver mowed down Israeli pedestrians, 
killing seven soldiers and a woman. Oddly, he was employed at Israel’s main bus company, and 
enjoyed a regular salary. To add to the confusion of analysts, he seemed to have acted of his own 
accord, and was, unlike most suicide bombers, not recruited by cells of Hamas, PIJ, or Fatah.  
Another exception was Izzedine al-Mazri, who killed 16 people at a Sbarro pizzeria at a 
busy intersection in central Jerusalem on August 9, 2001. Al-Mazri was the son of a wealthy 
businessman.
22 
On September 9, 2001, 48 year-old Muhammad Shaker Habeishi detonated a bomb at the 
train station in the northern Israeli town of Nahariya, killing himself and three other Israelis. 
Habeishi had run for mayor in the Galilee village of Abu Sinan about a year before the attack. A 
father of eight, he became the first Arab Israeli to commit an act of suicide terrorism.
23 
On December 5, 2001, Daoud Abu Sway died in a busy intersection in central Jerusalem, 
in what seemed to be a premature explosion of a device strapped to his body. Like Habeishi, 
                                                 
22 See Rebecca Trounson and Tracy Wilkinson, “After the Attack,” Los Angeles Times, September 20, 2001, p. A15. 
23 See Matthew Guttman, “The Bomber Next Door,” Jerusalem Post, September 14, 2001, p. 5B. 
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Sway was a father of eight, and like Habeishi, Sway’s age—he was forty-six—was more than 
double the average age of the ‘typical’ Palestinian suicide bomber.
24 
  The suicide attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 
2001, have further added to the confusion. Muhammad Atta, the suicide pilot of the first aircraft 
that hit the World Trade Center, was a 33-year old student at the Technical University in 
Hamburg, Germany. A seemingly intelligent and educated man, he did not appear to his peers as 
a victimized man who felt he had little to lose. Instead, he studied abroad and seemed to blend 
into German society relatively well. In the German weekly Der Spiegel, a former professor 
described him as “pious… yet not fanatical”, a “critical spirit…who even argued in favor of 
religious coexistence.”
25 Some of Atta’s fellow suicide hijackers came from Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates, two of the most affluent Arab countries. The hijackers’ origination 
from these oil-rich monarchies contradicts the traditional belief that suicide bombers are raised in 
an atmosphere of perpetual conflict or in poverty, and hence that their decision is an act of 
despair.   
The current intifada has generated another novelty that merits a reassessment of the 
traditional profile of the suicide terrorist, namely the willingness of women to become shuhadas, 
female martyrs, as they are referred to among many in the Middle East. In August 2001, a 
Palestinian woman subsequently classified as a suicide bomber was caught while attempting to 
carry a bomb into Tel Aviv’s central bus station.
26 On January 27, 2002, 27-year old Wafa Idris, 
                                                 
24 See Joel Greenberg, “A Family is Left ‘Sad and Happy’ by a Violent Death,” New York Times, December 7, 2001, 
p. A13. 
25 Ingo Butters, Cordula Meyer, and Caroline Schmidt, “Das Nest der Schläfer,” Der Spiegel (Internet Edition), 
September 14, 2001, available online at <http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/studium/0,1518,157489,00.html> 
26 Douglas Davis, “Report: Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers in Training,” Jerusalem Post Online News, August 
6, 2001. 
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a Fatah activist from the al-Amari refugee camp near Ramallah, carried a bomb that detonated in 
central Jerusalem, killing an 81-year old Israeli and injuring over a hundred more.
27   
By early April 2002, a total of three female suicide bombers have wreaked considerable 
havoc in Israeli population centers (see Figs. I, Ia). All three female suicide bombers were 
members of Fatah—a testament to the group’s secular, inclusive outlook. 
Female suicide bombers play an important role in many organizations that employ 
suicide bombings, oftentimes out of a desire to seek equality and to prove that they can be just as 
courageous as men. In Sri Lanka, over one-third of the suicide bombers of the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are women. In the PKK’s use of suicide bombings against Turkey, 
women carried out eleven out of fifteen successful attacks.
28 In the traditional Middle East, there 
is a precedent for the use of female suicide bombers. On March 10, 1985, 18-year old Sumayah 
Sa’ad drove a car loaded with dynamite into an Israeli military position in Southern Lebanon, 
killing twelve Israeli soldiers and wounding fourteen others. Roughly two weeks later, on March 
25, 17-year old San’ah Muheidli drove a TNT-laden car into an IDF convoy, killing two soldiers 
and wounding two more. The two women were posthumously awarded the honoring title of 
“Brides of Blood” (Arous ad-Damm).
29 
Given these novelties as witnessed during the suicide attacks against Israelis during the 
Second Intifada, a fundamental reappraisal of the profile of the Palestinian suicide bomber seems 
inevitable. The fact that Palestinian suicide bombers now seem to arise from a variety of social 
                                                 
27 On February 9, 2002, the New York Times reported that an Israeli government investigation concluded that Wafa 
Idris was in fact a suicide bomber. The investigation had been ordered since circumstances surrounding the attack 
were initially unclear, especially the question of whether Ms. Idris had attempted to plant a bomb and escape, or 
whether she had intended to die in the attack. See James Bennet, Israelis Declare Arab Woman was in Fact a Suicide 
Bomber, New York Times, February 9, 2002 (Internet Edition). 
28 See Yoram Schweitzer, “Suicide Terrorism: Development and Main Characteristics,” in ICT, Countering Suicide 
Terrorism, pp. 82-83. 
29 See Amir Taheri, Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism  (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1987), pp. 
126-129. 
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and economic backgrounds, may include women, and often differ significantly in age, 
strengthens the argument that the background of the suicide bomber is too multi-faceted to 
justify the categorization into a single profile. Moreover, available reports about the background 
of the suicide hijackers of September 11, combined with the above-mentioned deviations from 
the traditional profile of the Palestinian suicide bomber, suggest that there may also be a need to 
reassess the merits of establishing a universal profile of the suicide bomber. Some experts make 
a strong case in arguing that one single profile of suicide bombers, or of Palestinian suicide 
bombers, may no longer exist.
30  
Of course, the difficulties in establishing a profile of the Palestinian suicide bomber do 
not preclude the suspicion that individual suicide bombers are driven by a specific combination 
among an identifiable set of religious, personal, national, economic, sociological, and 
psychological motives. Hence, the exact combination of motivations differs from suicide bomber 
to suicide bomber. The following discussion highlights those motives that together form a ‘pool 
of possible motivations’. This pool then contains the specific set of combinations of motives that 
may contribute to an individual Palestinian’s willingness to die.  
 
Part II: The Motivations of the Suicide Bomber 
Religious Motives 
Given the complexity of the nature of motivations, it seems fair to question the chance of 
arriving at a full understanding of what motivates a person to detonate himself among a crowd of 
innocent people. An effort at sketching those underlying motivating factors that may lead to a 
person’s willingness to die, however, is as useful as it is important.  
                                                 
30 Author’s interview with Yoram Schweitzer, Hertzliya, Israel, January 8, 2002. 
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It is doubtful that religious explanations alone will generate a person’s willingness to die. 
Similarly, it is doubtful whether other motivations alone—nationalist, economic, or personal—
will be able to explain the phenomenon. If religious motivations by themselves would explain 
the phenomenon of suicide terrorism, then acts of suicide terrorism would have to occur in all 
places were religious fundamentalism is a powerful force. If economic motives alone would 
explain the phenomenon, then suicide terrorism as a tactic would be used in other places were 
economic despair persists.   
Since suicide terrorism does not occur in all places where the economic state is in shatters 
(say, in many parts of Africa), or where religious fundamentalism controls the political agenda 
(say, in Iran), it will be argued that it will ordinarily require a combination of some of the 
motives discussed in the following to convince ordinary people that the benefits of martyrdom 
outweigh the costs.  
Within this gamut of intentions, religious motives seem to play a relatively important 
role. Hamas and PIJ spokespeople, for example, confirmed to Nasra Hassan, a Pakistani 
journalist who interviewed nearly 250 ‘volunteers for martyrdom’, that all of them were deeply 
religious. She was also told that all volunteers for a suicide mission have to be convinced of the 
religious legitimacy of the act.
31  
When assessing Hassan’s reports, however, the statements about the deep piety of the 
candidates deserve some qualification: First, as Islamist groups, Hamas and PIJ only recruit 
deeply pious individuals in the first place, and hence exclude secular Palestinians who might be 
equally ready to become shaheeds, or martyrs. Second, after 2002, most suicide attacks were 
                                                 
31 Nasra Hassan, “An Arsenal of Believers: Talking to the ‘Human Bombs’,” New Yorker, November 19, 2001, p. 
38. 
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organized by Fatah, a secular Palestinian group, whose members need not necessarily be 
religious (Fig. II). 
To this day, Islamic scholars continue to debate whether suicide attacks against Israelis 
are legitimate. The religious among those who believe them to be a legitimate form of resistance, 
those who organize the attacks, and those who eventually carry them out, are usually associated 
with the radical Islamist branch of the Muslim tradition. Islamist groups and radical secular 
groups alike are consistent in using the terms shaheed (martyr) and istishhad (martyrdom) when 
referring to suicide attackers and suicide attacks, respectively, since ordinary suicide (intihar), 
i.e. suicide caused by personal distress, is expressly forbidden in Islam.  
 
The Islamist Interpretation of Jihad 
 
One Islamic tenet that has been the subject of much interpretation is the notion of Jihad, 
which carries two fundamental meanings that refer to the two fundamental struggles of the 
Muslim. Jihad al nafs is often described as “the struggle for one’s soul against one’s own base 
instinct”—an explanation that has been rejected by Islamists as heretical. Jihad bi al saif is the 
military struggle, the “holy war by means of the sword.”
32  
According to Islamists, the military fight against the non-believers is the real ‘Greater 
Jihad’. To support their claims, they invoke only those Quranic sections that equate warfare with 
the duty of the faithful Muslim.  
 
The Perception of the Enemy as an Infidel  
 
Radical Islamists divide true believers on the one side, and infidels on the other, into two 
mutually exclusive camps known as the Dar al-Iman, the City of Faith, and the Dar al-Harb, the 
                                                 
32 Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism, p. 130. 
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City of War.
33 The Dar al-Iman refers to those places where the rules of Islam are supreme and 
where Islamic laws are strictly obeyed. The Dar al-Harb, meanwhile, needs to be fought and 
cleansed of the infidels. The struggle against the Dar al-Harb is a holy one, and includes both 
domestic enemies of ‘true’ Islam—i.e., most Arab and Islamic leaders with the exception of the 
Iranian leadership—as well as external ones, first and foremost the United States and Israel.
34  
Islamists in general perceive the ‘West,’ and in particular the United States, to be at the 
forefront of an anti-Islamic conspiracy that tries to undermine the religion, culture, and values of 
the Islamic world. As examples, they cite U.S. support for Israel, the continued U.S. military 
presence in the Middle East, or U.S. bombings of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Among the perceived sins of the United States, its support for Israel is second to none. 
The latter is perceived by many as an outpost of the West who has helped disseminate a godless, 
evil, and corrupt Western culture of secularism, capitalism, consumerism, and sexism, which 
poses a threat to the basic tenets of Islam. 
35  
The perceived threat to Islamic culture that emanates from the West and Israel leads the 
Islamist movement to claim that the Jihad is an act of self-defense against the ‘enemies of God’. 
Hence, suicide bombings and other violent acts are regarded a legitimate means of self-defense. 
In the words of the former spiritual leader of Hizballah, Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, 
those who commit such activities “are not preachers of violence…Jihad in Islam is a defensive 
movement against those who impose violence.”
36    
                                                 
33 See, for example, Amir Taheri, Holy Terror, p. 20. 
34 Amir Taheri, Holy Terror, p. 20. 
35 See, for example, Reuven Paz, “The Islamic Legitimacy of Suicide Terrorism,” pp. 92. 
36 Quoted in Laura Marlowe, “A Fiery Cleric’s Defense of Jihad,” Time, January 15, 1996. See Bruce Hoffman, 
Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 97. 
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Another aspect of this Jihad is that despite his moral corruption, the enemy is perceived 
to be powerful and omnipresent
37—powerful because of his military superiority and 
technological advancement; and omnipresent because he is virtually everywhere and succeeds in 
spreading his negative influence. In fact, Islamists believe that the West has, since about the 
1960s, successfully infected most regimes in the Middle East that one would describe today as 
secular and/or moderate. Secular Arab or moderate Muslim leaders thus belong to the same 
dangerous category of godless enemies that the ‘true’ Muslim must defeat.  
 
Islam vs. Judaism 
 
More radical Islamists—many of whom can be found in territories under Palestinian 
control—consider the conspiracy against Islam to be spearheaded by Israel and Judaism. The 
Israeli counter-terrorism expert Reuven Paz argues that “after the establishment of Israel and the 
renaissance of the Islamist groups since the 1960s and 1970s,” the perceived anti-Islamic 
conspiracy spearheaded by the West and Israel “came to be viewed as a constant and perhaps 
eternal struggle between Judaism and Islam.”
38 Indeed, Palestinian rhetoric during the Second 
Intifada has been as anti-Jewish as it has been anti-Israeli in character. Accordingly, verbal 
attacks by Palestinian leaders and the media have targeted the ‘Jews’, and not only Israelis per 
se. Moreover, Palestinian journalists often play down the Holocaust, or even accuse the Jews of 
having invented it. Others deny the significance, and often the existence, of the ancient Jewish 
temples and call biblical stories a fabrication.  
The effect has been a drastic rhetorical escalation in the course of the Second Intifada, 
which often results in calls to murder Jews. On August 3, 2001, for instance, Sheikh Ibrahim 
Madhi held a Friday sermon at the Sheikh Ijlin Mosque in Gaza, where he said that “[t]he Koran 
                                                 
37 See Reuven Paz, “The Islamic Legitimacy of Suicide Terrorism,” p. 92. 
38 Reuven Paz, “The Islamic Legitimacy of Suicide Terrorism,” p. 91. 
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is very clear on this: The greatest enemies of the Islamic nation are the Jews, may Allah fight 
them… The people who are the most hostile toward the believers are the Jews and the 
Polytheists…. Nothing will deter them except for us voluntarily detonating ourselves in their 
midst.”
39  
 
Participation in the Jihad 
 
  In the sense that the Israeli-Palestinian struggle is perceived to be, at least partly, a 
struggle between Islam and Judaism, the participation in the struggle against Israel and the Jews 
as the embodiment of the ‘unislamic’ may well serve as a motive for potential shaheeds.  
As discussed, such a struggle is often seen as a war of self-defense, one that has been 
imposed on the Muslims and that justifies even the most vicious form of violence. At closer look, 
the notion of self-defense expands beyond the reference to the military struggle. Sheikh Ahmed 
Yasin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, and Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi, a co-founder and top official of 
the movement, for example, both expanded the notion of self-defense to include in it the 
protection of one’s dignity, pride, and well-being.
40 Rantisi’s statement also shows how religious 
motivations are sometimes difficult to distinguish from personal motivations such as the 
sensation of humiliation. 
 
Glorifying Death and Seeking Martyrdom 
 
Martyrdom has a long tradition in Islam, not only since the Ayatollah Khomeini declared 
no command “more binding to the Muslim than the command to sacrifice life and property to 
defend and bolster Islam.”
41 Istishhad is often associated more closely with the Shi’ite tradition, 
                                                 
39 “Friday Sermon on PA TV: Blessings to Whoever Saved a Bullet to Stick it in a Jew’s Head,” Special Dispatch 
No. 252, Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), August 7, 2001, available at <http://www.memri.org/> 
40 See Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, p. 80. 
41 Quoted in Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 153. 
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where the accepted view is that Hussein, the third Imam, was chosen by Allah to become a 
martyr when he entered the fateful battle of Karbala. Until today, Shi’ite tradition holds that the 
martyr wears the bassamat al-farah, the smile of joy, at the time that he accomplishes his duty.
42  
Since the first suicide bombing by an Islamist Palestinian group in the West Bank on 
April 16, 1993, and especially since the beginning of the Second Intifada in late September 2000, 
more and more Palestinians have expressed their wish and willingness to become martyrs by 
perpetrating ‘martyrdom operations’ against Israelis.
43 Interviewed by Nasra Hassan, one leader 
of the Al-Qassam Brigades, the military arm of Hamas, said that “it is easy for us to sweep the 
streets for boys who want to do a martyrdom operation. Fending off the crowds who demand 
revenge and retaliation and insisting on a human bomb operation—that becomes our biggest 
problem.”
44  
 
Juxtaposing Western Cowardice with Muslim Courage   
 
During the Second Intifada, the mufti of Jerusalem, Ikrama Sabri, was quoted saying that 
“The Muslim embraces death…Look at the society of the Israelis. It is a selfish society that loves 
life. These are not people who are eager to die for their country and their God. The Jews will 
leave this land rather than die, but the Muslim is happy to die.” 
45 
The mufti repeated a widely felt belief that people in the West, including Israelis/Jews, 
fear death. Islamists juxtapose this perception of the death-fearing infidel with the preparedness 
to die that is said to prevail among the true Muslim. Statements like that of the mufti are highly 
                                                 
42 On the bassamat al-farah, see for example Amir Taheri, Holy Terror, p. 134, Harvey Kushner, “Suicide Bombers: 
Business as Usual,” p. 331, and Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 100. See also Alan Philps, “Happy Man with a 
Bomb Strapped to his Waist,” Daily Telegraph, August 16, 2001, p. 11. 
43 See, for example, “Hundreds of Men, Women, Volunteer for ‘Martyrdom Operations’,” Palestinian Information 
Center, May 19, 2001, FBIS-NES, Document ID GMP20010519000045, “An Estimated 1,000 Martyrdom Bombers 
said Willing to Join Hamas’ Military Wing,” Al-Majd, August 20, 2001, FBIS-NES, GMP20010822000212. 
44 Nasra Hassan, “An Arsenal of Believers,” p. 39. 
45 Quoted in Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Martyr Strategy,” p. 36. 
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prolific in Gaza and the West Bank, and are connected to the belief that the West, including the 
Israelis/Jews are—despite their military strength—morally corrupt, seeking the pleasures of the 
good life, “protect[ing] their lives like a miser protects his money,”
46 and hence cowards.  
Such a mode of thinking could urge the shaheed into proving to the hedonist that unlike 
him, the shaheed is not afraid to lose his life. In the words of Reuven Paz, the members of the 
Islamist groups must show the enemy “that they are truly brave, because the ultimate bravery and 
heroism lie in seeking out death, thus showing the enemy as cowards and themselves as 
heroes.”
47  
Personal Motives 
While religion seems to play an important role for many suicide bombers, there is no 
reason to assume that the shaheed’s decision to embark on a ‘martyrdom operation’ is entirely 
selfless.  
 
The Benefits in the Afterlife 
 
The messenger of God said “A martyr has six privileges with God. He is 
forgiven his sins on the shedding of the first drop of his blood; he is shown his place 
in paradise; he is redeemed from the torments of the grave; he is made secure from 
the fear of hell and a crown of glory is placed on his head of which one ruby is 
worth more than the world and all that is in it; he will marry seventy-two of the huris 
with black eyes; and his intercession will be accepted for seventy of his kinsmen.” 
48  
                                                 
46 “Egyptian Government Daily on the Muslims’ Love of Death and Their Enemies’ Love of Life,” Special Dispatch 
No. 289, MEMRI, October 19, 2001, available at <http://www.memri.org/> 
47 Reuven Paz, “The Islamic Legitimacy of Suicide Terrorism,” p. 93. 
48 David C. Rapoport, “Sacred Terror: A Contemporary Example from Islam,” in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of 
Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
1998), pp. 117-118. 
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While much of the literature that describes the characteristics in paradise has flourished 
in the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, most original references to the benefits of the 
martyr in paradise can be found in hadiths that were collected following the prophet 
Muhammad’s death.
49 It is therefore not surprising that the modern day suicide bombers are not 
among the first Muslim group to believe that their act of istishhad will be followed by an ascent 
to a glorious heaven, where they will also see the face of Allah.
50 The medieval Assassins, the 
descendents of the Ishmaili sect, were partly motivated by the belief that they would immediately 
pass the gates to heaven if they would die during battle.
51 That belief continues to be held among 
some radical Islamists almost a millennium later. Asked how he felt when he was selected for a 
martyrdom operation, one shaheed, whose attempt to blow himself up on an Israeli bus failed, 
said that, “it’s as if a very high, impenetrable wall separated you from Paradise or Hell… Allah 
has promised one or the other to his creatures. So, by pressing the detonator, you can 
immediately open the door to Paradise—it is the shortest path to heaven.”
52 
Clearly, paradise seems to offer the martyr pleasures and benefits that he can only dream 
of in real life. If the shaheed, therefore, is convinced that he will enjoy those after-life benefits—
and there are signs that some Palestinians who want to volunteer for a ‘martyrdom operation’ 
do—then candidates for martyrdom are confronted with a powerful incentive to swap the little 
that they possess for the luxuries they are promised.   
 
 
The Suicide Bomber’s Elevated Status after Death  
 
                                                 
49 Author’s interview with Reuven Paz, January 6, 2002. 
50 Compare Boaz Ganor, “Suicide Attacks in Israel,” in ICT, Countering Suicide Terrorism, pp. 138-139. 
51 See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 89. 
52 Nasra Hassan, “An Arsenal of Believers,” p. 36. 
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An additional incentive to the suicide bomber is provided by the elevation of his status 
after the suicide mission is completed—an elevation that is given significant impetus by a virtual 
cult of the suicide bomber among many Palestinians. 
This rise in social status after the suicide bomber’s death seems all the more appealing 
when considered that the Palestinian shaheeds are raised in a culture where honor and dignity are 
highly treasured, if not “in the nature of Islam,” as one senior Hamas official put it,
53 and where 
becoming a martyr is among the highest, if not the highest, honor.  
The elevated stature of the shaheed among Palestinians finds many expressions, 
beginning with the circulation of posters and leaflets carrying his name and picture. These 
posters are then placed in public areas, including on school walls and mosques.
54 The sponsoring 
organization would normally distribute a videotape of the shaheed, in which he urges others to 
follow his example. Maybe most important, every attack is followed by a rally commemorating 
the suicide bomber, where the number of participants at times lies in the thousands.  
It is not difficult to fathom that many a young Gazan is looking at the glorification of this 
martyred Palestinian hero with a mixture of admiration and jealousy, and would even hope to 
reach the same kind of transcendent fame himself. In fact, he or she might—and rightfully so—
regard martyrdom as the only way, given the circumstances, to attain a similar status.    
 
Benefits to the Suicide Bomber’s Family 
 
A suicide bomber’s mission will provide his family with both tangible and intangible 
rewards. After the suicide attack, both the material and the social status of the shaheed’s family 
improve significantly. The family usually receives a cash payment of between $1,000 and 
                                                 
53 See interview with Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi, in Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, pp. 187-188. 
54 See, for example, Lee Hockstader, “At Arab, Israeli Schools, Hatres is Common Bond,” Washington Post, 
September 5, 2001, p. A1. 
 
Suicide Bombings in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Conceptual Framework 
 Assaf Moghadam                                                                      Page 26 
several thousand dollars from Hamas, the PIJ, and sometimes from third parties, such as the Iraqi 
leader Saddam Hussein.
55  
One journalist who visited the family of Ismail al-Masawabi, who killed himself and two 
Israeli sergeants on June 22, 2001 with a suicide device, described the material improvement of 
the family in the New York Times Magazine. The Al-Masawabis, who used to live in a squalid 
refugee camp prior to the bombing, now lived in an apartment that was “spacious by Gaza 
standards… Everything in it looked new—the appliances, rugs and stuffed furniture, the gaudy 
wall clocks, even the bracelet and rings Ismail’s mother was wearing.”
56  
 
Revenge 
 
An additional motivation to volunteer for a suicide mission may be for the shaheed to 
avenge the death or injury of a close friend or family member. Due to the tiny size of the area 
ravaged by decades of conflict, an extremely high population density, and high casualty and 
injury rates especially during the Second Intifada, hardly any Palestinian has remained 
untouched by the violence, and many Palestinians—as well as Israelis—personally know 
somebody who has been injured or killed during the conflict. As a result, calls for revenge have 
been highly common on both sides of the conflict.  
On the Palestinian side, revenge is often called for during funeral processions of 
Palestinians killed by Israeli forces.
57 Although a recent Israeli assessment found that revenge 
                                                 
55 See, for example, Roni Shaked, “$10,000 per ‘Shahid’,” Yediot Ahronot, December 13, 2000, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/  In March 2002, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that some 46 families of Tulkarm 
received checks of $25,000 for each martyr, and of $10,000 for each Palestinian shot by Israeli troops, from Saddam 
Hussein. See “Witwenrente von Saddam?” SPIEGEL Online, March 26, 2002, 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,189096,00.html 
56 Joseph Lelyveld, All Suicide Bombers are Not Alike,” New York Times Magazine, October 28, 2001, p. 50. 
57 See, for example, “Hamas Military Wing Promises Suicide Operations to Avenge 11-Year Old Boy,” London 
Quds Press, FBIS-NES, GMP20010708000123. 
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alone is seldom a motive,
58 and although those who train the shaheeds insist that revenge alone 
is not acceptable before Allah as a reason for seeking martyrdom,
59 it is not hard to fathom that 
many, if not most, suicide bombers share a feeling of revenge. In addition, some suicide bombers 
have admitted that revenge was their primary motive: Nafez al-Nether, who detonated himself 
and several Israeli soldiers on July 9, 2001, said he wanted to avenge the blood of Palestinians 
killed by Israel. One of those Palestinians was Nafez’ brother Fayez, who was killed during the 
first intifada in clashes that took place in the Jabalya refugee camp.
60 
 
Dignity vs. Humiliation 
 
There are numerous hints that a sense of humiliation, and the need to regain some pride 
with a dignified act, might also motivate a suicide bomber. There is no dearth of references to the 
humiliation felt by most Palestinians who continue to live under Israeli occupation, and how this 
feeling motivates them to commit an act of terrorism. Al Majallah, a London-based, Saudi-
owned Arabic weekly conducted an interview with a so-called ‘living martyr’—a volunteer for 
martyrdom who has been recruited and is currently undergoing training. The person, who 
identified himself as Ahmad, told the correspondent that “martyrdom is a duty and a right. There 
is no humiliation like that of living under the occupation. So imagine how it is if the occupier is 
the arrogant Zionist.”
61  In a similar statement, an Islamic Jihad operative told a reporter of the 
Christian Science Monitor that the Palestinians’ “main objective is to satisfy God’s will by 
undertaking Jihad.” The other is to regain the Palestinians’ “stolen land and dignity.”
62 Hamas 
                                                 
58 “Profile of a Suicide Bomber: Single Male, Average Age 21,” Ha’aretz (Online Edition), August 24, 2001.  
59 Nasra Hassan, “An Arsenal of Believers,” p. 41. 
60 “Palestinian Suicide Bomber Dies in Gaza Blast,” Reuters, July 9, 2001. 
61 “Palestinian ‘Suicide Bomber’ Interviewed on Motives, Family Background,” Al Majallah, August 19, 2001, in 
FBIS-NES, GMP20010822000152. 
62 Cameron W. Barr, “A Suicide Bomber’s World,” Christian Science Monitor, August 14, 2001. 
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co-founder Abdul Aziz Rantisi agrees that dishonoring someone is the worst act that can be 
done, the only remedy being the regaining of one’s dignity.
63 
 
The Expectation of Sexual Benefits 
 
Islamic scholars are in utter disagreement over whether Islamic texts refer to sexual pleasures 
awaiting the martyrs, and an extensive discussion of the subject is beyond the scope of this 
paper.
64 Ultimately, however, the question of whether Islamic texts promise sexual pleasures to 
the martyr is less important than establishing whether religious leaders and operatives of Islamist 
and other radical groups attempt to and are able to convince young Palestinians that they will 
indeed attain such benefits in the afterlife. Statements collected by the Middle East Media 
Research Institute (MEMRI), as well as other sources, clearly indicate that not only do some 
operatives and religious scholars promote this belief, but a large number of youth are persuaded 
of attaining future pleasures as a reward for martyrdom.
65  
Sixteen year-old Bassam Khalifi, for instance, told Western journalists, “I know my life 
is poor compared to Europe and America, but I have something awaiting me that makes all my 
suffering worthwhile…. Most boys can’t stop thinking about the virgins.”
66 
In an even more compelling example, the Israeli daily Ma’ariv reported that one suicide 
bomber, Mahdi Abu Malek, whose attempt to commit an attack by means of a wagon was 
botched by the IDF, had wrapped toilet paper around his genitals. He evidently wanted to assure 
protection of his genitals for later use in the Garden of Eden.
67  
                                                 
63 See Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, p. 187. 
64 For an extensive discussion on the subject, see Yotam Feldner, “’72 Black-Eyed Virgins: A Muslim Debate on the 
Rewards of Martyrs,” Inquiry and Analysis No. 74, MEMRI, October 30, 2001, available at  
http://www.memri.org/> 
65 Yotam Feldner, “’72 Black-Eyed Virgins,” MEMRI. 
66 Jack Kelley, “ The Secret World of Suicide Bombers,” USA Today, June 26, 2001, p. 1A. 
67 Moshe Sunder, “The Lost Garden of Eden,” Ma’ariv (Weekend Section), August 17, 2001, p. 28 (Hebrew). 
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The Palestinian press often prints death announcements of ‘martyrs’ in the form of 
wedding announcements, corroborating the suspicion that martyrs expect to marry the ‘huris’, 
the ‘black-eyed virgins’, soon after their martyrdom. One representative ‘wedding 
announcement’ read: “With great pride, the PIJ marries the member of its military wing… the 
martyr and hero Yasser Al-Adhami, to ‘the black-eyed’.”
68 Descriptions of suicide bombers’ 
deaths as ‘martyr’s weddings’ are common in Muslim tradition, and not confined to Palestinian 
suicide bombers. ‘Bride of Blood’ San’ah Muheidli, for example, who drove her yellow 
Mercedes into an Israeli military convoy in southern Lebanon on April 9, 1985, instructed her 
mother in a videotape to “be merry, to let your joy explode as if it were my wedding day.”
69 
 
Nationalist Motives 
 
Many Palestinian suicide bombers appear to flock to Hamas, PIJ, and Fatah for 
nationalist reasons. Videotapes of suicide bombers, as well as statements of volunteers, ‘living 
martyrs’, or families of suicide bombers clearly suggest that many Palestinians perceive a deep 
sense of injustice done to them by a ‘Zionist entity’ that deprived Palestinians of their land and 
continues to deny them a worthy existence on what they regard to be Palestinian soil.  
Most suicide bombers express a willingness to avoid the repetition of the 1948 nakba, i.e. 
the ‘catastrophe’ of the creation of the State of Israel, and clearly express their readiness to “die 
in defense of their land.”
70 It should be kept in mind here that in the Middle Eastern tradition, the 
                                                 
68 Yotam Feldner, “’72 Black-Eyed Virgins: A Muslim Debate on the Rewards of Martyrs,” Inquiry and Analysis 
No. 74, MEMRI, October 30, 2001, available at <http://www.memri.org/> 
69 Amir Taheri, Holy Terror, p. 128. 
70 “Palestinian ‘Suicide Bomber’ Interviewed on Motives, Family Background,” Al Majallah, August 19, 2001, in 
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notion of territory, including that of the ‘house’, has a very high significance. The house is where 
the family is based—a social unit whose members are treated with utmost respect, and whose 
dignity and honor need to be preserved at all costs. Considering that the house connects the 
victimized Palestinian resident to the territory he or she was deprived of, it becomes an 
imperative to defend what little is left against any continued infringement on the part of the 
Israeli enemy.  
Statements by Palestinian political leaders reflect the centrality of Palestinian nationalism 
as a motive. Reacting to the suicide bombing in front of Tel Aviv’s Dolphinarium, top Hamas 
official Al-Rantisi told Al-Jazeera TV that Palestinians “will never approve of the occupation of 
[their] homeland. I frankly advise the Jews who were deceived and who were brought from 
Poland, America, and Europe, and settled in Palestine at the expense of an entire population 
some fifty-three years ago, to spare their blood and return to where they came from. This is the 
only solution that will provide them with security.”
71 
Doubtless, these nationalist motives are intimately linked to and strengthened by the 
overwhelming sense of humiliation Palestinians have experienced over the five decades of Israeli 
occupation. Unlike in the first Intifada, which erupted in December 1987, Palestinians today live 
under Palestinian Authority rule. Nevertheless, the continued lack of territorial contiguity, and 
the persistent division of clusters of autonomous Palestinian areas by Israeli roadblocks and army 
checkpoints, generate frustrations that are similar to those Palestinians felt over a decade ago. In 
their seminal account of the first intifada (1987-1993), Israeli journalists Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud 
Ya’ari described the expressed motives of some Palestinians who were detained by the IDF at 
the beginning of the first intifada. It is worthwhile recounting them here: 
                                                 
71 “Hamas Leader Al-Rantisi Reacts to Tel Aviv Explosion,” Doha Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel Television, June 1, 
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“All of them cited much the same motive: the feeling that they had suffered a grave 
personal injustice at the hands of their Jewish employers or colleagues. Each 
prisoner had his own story to tell, but the gist of their experiences was similar: at 
one time or another they had been subjected to verbal and even physical abuse, 
cheated out of their wages, set to work under inhuman conditions, and exposed to 
the sweep of the dragnet that followed every act of terrorism. All complained of the 
insult and humiliation repeatedly suffered at army roadblocks and checkpoints: the 
nasty tone in which they were addressed, the body searches accompanied by shoves 
and shouts, the derision they were forced to endure in front of family and friends.”
72 
 
Apart from feelings of humiliation, an additional catalyst for the Palestinian resistance 
against the Israeli occupation is what may be termed the ‘national Jihad’
73—a struggle that 
serves the purpose of strengthening a Palestinian national entity and identity. In this case, the 
gradual formation of a national heritage coincides with what many on both sides of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict perceive to be a cosmic struggle between good and evil. It appears that this 
very notion of a national Jihad, fought as part of a larger cosmic battle, is particularly conducive 
to extreme forms of violence as witnessed during the Second Intifada and before.   
Fighting the national Jihad serves several other purposes, apart from dying for the sake of 
Palestine. It generates a sense of pride and belonging to a national group that fights a seemingly 
invincible enemy. It can be fulfilling in the sense that the Zionist enemy’s sense of invincibility 
                                                 
72 Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising—Israel’s Third Front (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1989), pp. 82-83. 
73 Author’s interview with Reuven Paz, Hertzliya, Israel, January 6, 2002. 
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is shattered, which in turn humiliates the enemy and provides the shaheed with a tremendous 
sense of achievement.  
Suicide terrorism fulfills two tactical roles here. First, it is a highly effective tactic used in 
the asymmetric warfare against Israel, as will be described in more detail in Part III. Most 
Palestinians are certainly aware of these tactical advantages of suicide bombings, and to some it 
probably serves as a motive. Dr. Ramadan Shalah, Secretary General of the PIJ, put it as follows: 
“Our enemy possesses the most sophisticated weapons in the world and its army is trained to a 
very high standard… We have nothing with which to repel killing and thuggery against us except 
the weapon of martyrdom. It is easy and costs us only our lives…human bombs cannot be 
defeated, not even by nuclear bombs.”
74 Closely connected is the fact that suicide bombings are 
a form of psychological warfare. As such, they fuel the belief that the enemy can be worn down 
over time, weakening Israeli society, while strengthening the Palestinian nation. In the process, 
the Israeli society is being instilled with fear. As we shall see later, these tactical advantages are 
a major factor in the decision by organizations to employ suicide bombings. At the same time, it 
would be wrong to underestimate the appeal that these tactical and psychological characteristics 
of suicide bombings have on individuals. Some individuals may even be driven by these 
particular traits of suicide bombings. Following one suicide bombing, one 19-year old 
Palestinian laborer asked a journalist from the Associated Press, “Did you see how the Jews were 
crying on television? I want to become a martyr like that to scare the Jews, to send them to 
hell.”
75  
 
                                                 
74 See Ehud Sprinzak, “Rational Fanatics,” Foreign Policy, September/October 2000, p. 68. 
75 Donna Abu Nasr, “Suicide Bombers United in Deadly Goal,” Ottawa Citizen, January 30, 1995, p. A6. 
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Economic Motives 
Living in economic distress can be an additional—though neither essential nor central—
underlying motive in the formation of a willingness to die among many Palestinians in Gaza and 
the West Bank. In the occupied territories, the most pressing economic and demographic 
problems are population density, a low standard of living, a high rate of unemployment and, 
maybe worst, a lack of prospects for a better future.  
Most of the economic predicaments in the Palestinian-controlled areas have existed for 
decades. They resulted from the post-1967 Israeli economic domination, which made any 
improvement in the Palestinian standard of living conditional upon some direct connection to the 
economy in Israel proper.
76 In addition, for most of the Israeli occupation, Palestinians have 
faced a stubborn and paralyzing Israeli bureaucracy. In the words of Schiff and Ya’ari, “the 
Palestinians found themselves completely at the mercy of the [Israeli] Civil Administration in 
every sphere of economic life. Each request for a permit, grant, or dispensation entailed an 
exhausting wrestle with a crabbed bureaucracy of mostly indifferent but sometimes hostile clerks 
and officials—a veritable juggernaut of 400 Jewish mandarins managing thousands of Arab 
minions bereft of all authority.” 
Today, the Gaza Strip is home to roughly 1.2 million people—about half of whom are 
fourteen years or younger—all sharing an area that is slightly larger than twice the size of 
Washington, D.C.
77 In the early 1990s, unemployment in the West Bank and Gaza together was 
under 5%, but it jumped to over 20% by the mid-1990s. Since 1997 and until September 2000, 
the economic situation in the Palestinian areas has generally improved, partly due to Israeli 
policies aimed at reducing the impact of closures and other measures. As a result, GDP in 1998 
                                                 
76 Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Intifada, p. 91. 
77 CIA World Factbook, 2001, December 28, 2001, available at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> 
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and 1999 grew by 5% and 6%, respectively, until the last quarter of 2000, when the outbreak of 
the Second Intifada led to renewed Israeli closures and the disruption of labor and trade 
movement in and out of the Palestinian self-rule areas. 
78 
The Second Intifada has drastically worsened the economic plight of the over three 
million Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. According to a report by the United 
Nations Special Commissioner on the Occupied Territories (UNSCO), unemployment rose to 
25% one year after the beginning of the Second Intifada, while the underlying jobless rate in 
Gaza alone was as high as 50%.
79  
The UNSCO report said that the cost of the Second Intifada to the Palestinian economy 
after one year lay at between $2.4 and $3.2 billion. At the same time, revenues of the PA 
plummeted by 57% in the first nine months alone. Real incomes decreased by an average 37%, 
resulting in 46% of Palestinians living below the poverty line—twice as many as prior to the 
Second Intifada.
80 
Given these harsh economic realities prevalent in Gaza and the West Bank, some 
Palestinians may sense hopelessness and despair, and may prefer a better life in the hereafter to 
their miserable existence in refugee camps. Economic distress may also have the effect of 
driving Palestinians to seek revenge against those they hold responsible for the conditions they 
find themselves in. One elderly resident of the West Bank town of Jenin urged a journalist, 
“Look around and see how we live here. Then maybe you will understand why there are always 
                                                 
78 CIA World Factbook, 2001, December 28, 2001, available at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> 
79 Harvey Morris, “Closures in West Bank and Gaza ‘Hurting Israel’, UNSCO Report,” Financial Times, December 
21, 2001, p. 8. 
80 Harvey Morris, “Closures in West Bank and Gaza ‘Hurting Israel’, UNSCO Report,” Financial Times, December 
21, 2001, p. 8. 
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volunteers for martyrdom. Every good Muslim understands that it’s better to die fighting than 
live without hope.”
81 
Whatever ultimately contributes to a person’s growing willingness to die, it should be 
clear that economic depravity in and of itself is an insufficient explanation as to the emergence of 
a widespread willingness to die among large parts of a population, and hence to the phenomenon 
of suicide bombings. The phenomenon of suicide bombings is completely absent in many other 
areas where economic difficulties persist. These areas include Arab countries such as Syria and 
Lebanon that house Palestinian refugee camps that are, at best, as squalid as those in the West 
Bank and Gaza. As has also been seen, some of the suicide bombers have come from relatively 
well-off families. Hence, it seems that economic motives for the evolution of a willingness to die 
must interact with other motives in order to result in the use of suicide bombings by a particular 
group.  Economic distress may well have a higher potential to result in such drastic tactics as 
suicide bombings where it coincides with an ideology that seems to justify the use of all means 
against a demonized enemy. That distress is even more likely to result in suicide bombings 
where it is joined by a general sense of humiliation and felt frustration, and where these emotions 
are regarded as a threat to one’s dignity, honor, and respectability. Hence, economic stress as a 
contributing factor to pre-existing motives is highly context-driven, and can play an important 
role in escalating a situation that is already conducive to violence.   
 
                                                 
81 Philip Jacobson, “Home-grown Martyrs of the West Bank Reap Deadly Harvest,” Sunday Telegraph, August 19, 
2001, p. 20. 
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Sociological and Psychological Aspects of Suicide 
Bombings 
Sociological and psychological aspects of terrorism and violence may help shed further 
light on the phenomenon of suicide terrorism in general, and among Palestinians in particular. It 
will become clear in the following that some of these aspects—such as peer pressure—have the 
capacity to increase an individual’s willingness to die. Other aspects, however, may only serve to 
better describe the environment from which the suicide bombers thrive, although these may not 
constitute motives as such.   
Mark Juergensmeyer points out that as in many other societies, young Palestinians 
between the ages of sixteen and twenty-two are in a “liminal state between two life stages,” 
where they are neither children in their parents’ families, nor have they created their own 
families. This situation can become a problem especially in societies that are built around family 
units. In such circumstances, religious movements may help fill the vacuum that the youth faces, 
and they often provide a home and an extended kinship. This situation renders the youth 
“vulnerable to the voices of powerful leaders and images of glory...”
82  
Another obvious social phenomenon is the support that the ‘volunteers for martyrdom’ 
receive among the Palestinian population. In the summer of 2001, popular support for suicide 
bombings among Palestinians reached an all-time high, with over seventy percent of Palestinians 
expressing their support for such attacks, according to a poll conducted by the Palestinian Center 
                                                 
82 See Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, p. 191. 
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for Public Opinion.
83 Towards the end of that year, support for suicide bombings dropped 
somewhat, but still lay over sixty percent.
84  
In fact, ‘martyrdom operations’ have long reached the status of a pop culture in Gaza and 
the West Bank. An-Najah University in Nablus, for example, marked the first anniversary of the 
beginning of the Second Intifada by sponsoring an exhibition on ‘martyrdom operations’ that 
featured reenactments of suicide bombings.
85 In the streets of Gaza, young kids are known to 
play a game called shuhada, which even includes a mock funeral,
86 and teenage rock groups sing 
songs praising the latest martyrdom operation.
87 Asked to name their heroes, young Palestinians 
often mention shaheeds such as Saeed Hutari, who detonated a device strapped to himself while 
standing among a crowd of young Israelis at the Dolphinarium nightclub on the Tel Aviv 
beachfront on June 1, 2001.
88 
There have been reports about parents who proudly supported their child’s self-sacrifice. 
Hassan Hotari, father of the Dolphinarium bomber, reacted to his son’s attack by saying “I am 
very happy and proud of what my son did and, frankly, am a bit jealous…I wish I had done [the 
bombing]. My son has fulfilled the Prophet’s wishes. He has become a hero! Tell me, what more 
could a father ask?”
89 
                                                 
83 Public Opinion Poll, June 2001, available at the website of the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre 
(JMCC), http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/pop/01/jun/pop4.htm 
84  Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre Poll, December 2001, available at  
http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2001/no43.htm 
85 Mohammed Daraghmeh, “Palestinians Mark Intifada with Gruesome Exhibition,” Associated Press, in Jerusalem 
Post (Internet Edition), September 23, 2001; “Arafat Orders Exhibition of Suicide Bombing Closed,” Associated 
Press, in Jerusalem Post (Internet Edition), September 25, 2001. 
86 See Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Martyr Strategy: What Does the New Phase of Terrorism Signify?” New Yorker, July 
9, 2001, p. 34. 
87 See Harvey Kushner, “Suicide Bombers: Business as Usual,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 19:329-337, 
1996, p. 334. 
88 See Lee Hockstader, “At Arab, Israeli Schools, Hatres is Common Bond,” Washington Post, September 5, 2001, 
p. A1. 
89 Jack Kelley, “The Secret World of Suicide Bombers,” USA Today, June 26, 2001, p. 1A. 
 
Suicide Bombings in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Conceptual Framework 
 Assaf Moghadam                                                                      Page 38 
This social support has also extended into the larger Arab and Islamic world, where a 
plethora of editorials in Islamist, but also in some of the more moderate Arab and Islamic 
newspapers pledge support for the courageous deeds of the oppressed Palestinian people.
90 
According to most terrorism experts, this ‘cult’ of the suicide bomber is among the most 
important reasons why there seems to be a steady flow of Palestinians willing to die.
91  
Another sociological aspect relates to the harsh demographic realities of Gazan society, 
which were described above. In one of the world’s most densely populated regions plagued by 
economic difficulties, achieving any degree of economic or personal ‘success’ may seem 
impossible. Becoming a martyr, on the other hand, may well present a remedy to this 
predicament by providing an opportunity to stand out of the crowd and becoming, literally, a 
celebrity. It certainly endows the shaheed with a sense of individuality that he is otherwise 
unlikely to achieve in any other way.  
These sociological aspects are closely linked to psychological explanations of violence, 
which can help provide additional insight into the phenomenon.  
Among psychological explanations of the phenomenon, theories of group dynamics seem 
particularly pertinent. First, many Palestinian youth seem particularly susceptible to peer 
pressure manifested by the cult of the suicide bomber as described above. Second, there is a 
certain element of pressure—although not physical—by the organization that plans the suicide 
bombing, as will be described. One mechanism that seems particularly important in pressuring 
the volunteer for martyrdom psychologically is the preparation of videotapes prior to the 
attack—an act that all but seals the fate of the ‘living martyr’, and will be described in more 
detail in Part III. 
                                                 
90 See articles translated by MEMRI, http://www.memri.org/ 
91 Author’s interviews with Reuven Paz, Yoram Schweitzer, and Ehud Sprinzak. 
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It is also useful to briefly sketch some psychological theories of why individuals are 
driven to commit acts of violence. Some analysts argue that political terrorists are driven to 
commit acts of violence as a consequence of psychological forces. Their ‘psycho-logic’, as 
Jerrold Post argues, is constructed to rationalize acts that they are psychologically compelled to 
commit. They are therefore drawn to the path of terrorism in order to commit acts of violence.
92 
In another theory that could be applied to understanding suicide bombers’ motivation, 
C.R. Mitchell describes the need for groups in conflict situations to arrive at ‘cognitive 
consistency’. He mentions several ways in which they can achieve this, including ‘stereotyping’ 
and dehumanization of the adversary
93, clearly a common mode of conduct among many suicide 
bombers and their organizers, who often refer to Jews and Israelis as animals or subhuman 
creatures. A particularly telling example of dehumanization was provided by an 11-year old 
pupil at an Islamic school in Gaza, who said: “I will make my body a bomb that will blast the 
flesh of Zionists, the sons of pigs and monkeys. I will tear their bodies into little pieces and cause 
them more pain than they will ever know.”
94 Juergensmeyer regards this delegitimization as 
leading to the ‘dehumiliation’ of the humiliated group, as it provides escape from humiliating 
and impossible predicaments. “They become involved in terrorism not only to belittle their 
enemies but also to provide themselves with a sense of power...”
95 
  Human needs theory may provide another useful, albeit not unproblematic, model of why 
people resort to violence. James Davies writes that the frustration of substantive needs, such as 
                                                 
92 See Jerrold Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces, in Walter 
Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism, p. 25. 
93 On stereotyping, see C.R. Mitchell, “Psychological Dimensions of Conflict,” in idem, The Structure of 
International Conflict, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), p. 82. On dehumanization, see ibid., p. 85, and R. Scott 
Appleby, “The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religious Justifications of Violence,” Carnegie/Notre Dame Conference 
on “The Role of Religion in Preventing Deadly Conflict,” Tantur Ecumenical Institute, Jerusalem, August 1995, p. 
19-20. 
94 Quoted in Jack Kelley, “The Secret World of Suicide Bombers,” USA Today, June 26, 2001, p. 1A. 
95 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, p. 183. 
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the need for food, shelter, and self-actualization, facilitates the transition to aggressive 
behavior.
96 Human needs theory, however, is unable to explain why some people are willing to 
forgo their most basic needs (in the suicide bomber’s case, the need to survive) for a religious or 
other commitment.
97 
Albert Bandura’s theory of the mechanisms of moral disengagement appears highly 
useful in providing further insight into psychological explanations for terrorism. Mechanisms of 
moral disengagement denote the disconnection, or ‘disengagement,’ of internal moral control 
from ‘destructive conduct’—a process that requires intensive psychological training.
98 Bandura 
describes several such methods, some of which may help explain psychological processes at 
work: Moral justification involves cognitive restructuring of the moral value of killing and can 
help explain how reprehensible conduct can be perpetrated by ‘decent’ people.
99 Euphemistic 
labeling provides a convenient device for masking reprehensible activities or even conferring a 
respectable status on them. The use of the terms istishhad and shaheed is the obvious example. A 
third mechanism is advantageous comparison, which can serve a party to make self-deplorable 
acts “appear righteous by contrasting them with flagrant inhumanities…. Thus, terrorists 
minimize their slayings as the only defensive weapon they have to curb the widespread cruelties 
inflicted on their people.”
100   
                                                 
96 See Dennis J. D. Sandole,  “Paradigm, Theories, and Metaphors in Conflict and Conflict Resolution: Coherence or 
Confusion?” in Dennis J. D. Sandole (ed.), Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice, (Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1993) p. 14. 
97 See also Marc Gopin, Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and 
Peacemaking (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 52. 
98 Albert Bandura, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,” in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism,  
pp. 161-163. 
99 Albert Bandura, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,” p. 164. 
100 Albert Bandura, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,” p. 171. 
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Part III: Organizational Aspects of Suicide Bombings 
 
 
A major argument in this study is that suicide terrorism must be understood as both an 
individual as well as an organizational phenomenon, where the individual aspects of suicide 
terrorism refer mainly to the set of motivations that draw many Palestinians to suicide terrorism.   
  Organizational aspects of suicide terrorism are just as important to understand, and will 
be discussed in the remainder of this study. Organizations are the key providers of the many 
resources and services necessary to sustain a prolonged and ‘effective’ campaign of suicide 
terrorism, including fundraising; the procurement of weapons and the technical know-how for 
their assembly and use; the recruitment, training, and indoctrination of the shaheed; overall 
decision-making and strategy planning; intelligence-gathering; target selection; and public 
relations.
101 
  
Suicide Terrorism as an Organizational and Group 
Phenomenon 
 
  The insights that organizational and group theory can bestow on the understanding of 
terrorism has often been underestimated, and studies that focus on organizational aspects of 
terrorism are therefore rare.
102 In the following, a number of concepts adopted from 
organizational and group theory will be introduced and applied to the phenomenon of suicide 
                                                 
101 The author would like to thank Jessica Stern for her insightful comments on the role of organizations in terrorism. 
102 A notable exception is Martha Crenshaw, who focuses much of her research on organizational aspects of 
terrorism. Ariel Merari, as has been noted, focuses on the organizational aspects of suicide terrorism. 
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terrorism. This discussion should be considered far from exhaustive, given the relative dearth of 
research both into the phenomenon of suicide terrorism, as well as into terrorism as an 
organizational phenomenon.  
 
Strategic Fit 
 
  One concept within organizational theory that is often referred to by strategists is known 
as ‘strategic fit’. In this regard, the term ‘fit’, according to organizational theorist Mary Jo Hatch, 
describes “a successful strategy as one that brings what the organization can do (its 
competencies) into alignment with the needs and demands of its environment.” Strategy here is 
meant as “actively managing fit in order to achieve competitive advantage which will ensure the 
organization’s survival, profitability, and reputation.”
103 Organizations that possess strategic fit 
may reap both tangible and intangible benefits. According to Hatch, when the organization’s 
competencies match, or ‘fit’ the demands of the environment, the organization is selected, 
retained, provided with resources, and legitimized. 
104 
  Applying this concept to the groups under scrutiny, one might argue that organizations 
such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who, as organizations, certainly strive for persistence and 
legitimization, believe their actions to promote a strategic fit with the environment. Given, then, 
the degree of support that suicide bombings enjoy among ordinary Palestinians, the continuous 
employment of suicide bombings could certainly promote a thinking whereby suicide bombings 
appear to be a rational strategy, since it helps consolidating legitimacy for the organization in the 
eyes of the public. 
                                                 
103 Mary Jo Hatch, Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Post-Modern Perspectives (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), pp. 102-103. 
104 See Mary Jo Hatch, Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Post-Modern Perspectives (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), pp. 102-103. 
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  Consequently, the concept of ‘strategic fit’ may help explain how continuous sympathy 
for suicide terrorism among the Palestinian public is likely to provide incentives to groups such 
as Hamas and PIJ to continue with these tactics. 
 
Terrorism as a ‘Public Good’ 
 
Kent Layne Oots refers to terrorist groups as political organizations because they seek to 
provide, in the economic sense, ‘public goods’. A political organization, he writes, “seeks to 
further the common interests of its members through the provision of public goods,” which may 
be tangible goods, such as weapons or roads, or intangible goods such as, say, a new leader. The 
utility provided by these public goods may be positive or negative for society at large, though 
usually positive in the eyes of those who favor those goods.
 105 
Terrorist organizations, of course, differ in some significant respects from ordinary 
interest groups, particularly in the methods in which they attempt to provide these public goods.  
Applied to the case of Palestinian organizations, one could argue that Hamas, PIJ, and 
Fatah attempt to provide public goods to their supporters and beyond. Hamas, for example, can 
certainly be said to provide public goods in the form of religious education, which would be a 
tangible public good. Its military wing also believes to provide public goods, yet probably of 
more intangible sorts, such as pride and dignity through resistance, and even a Palestinian state 
based on Islam. 
 
Organizational Structure 
 
Most terrorist organizations are structured hierarchically, with the memberships divided 
into ‘cells’ of between three and five persons. P.N. Grabosky studied the organization of urban 
                                                 
105 See Kent Layne Oots, A Political Organization Approach to Transnational Terrorism (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1986), pp. 45-46. 
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terrorists, yet many of his insights are also applicable to the organization of other terrorist 
groups, including groups that employ suicide terrorist tactics. 
The ideal organization, Grabosky writes, does not permit “lateral communication 
between cells, nor vertical communication upward in the hierarchy. Thus, members of different 
cells remain unknown to each other, and the identity of a superordinate is known only to one 
member of a subordinate unit.”
 106 
A hierarchically arranged cellular structure carries both certain benefits, but also some 
disadvantages. Kohl and Litt, for example, have suggested that component units can be 
mobilized relatively easy if the cellular structure is arranged in a hierarchical order, At the same 
time, such a hierarchy is more vulnerable to “decapitation.” Meanwhile, a more decentralized 
organization will tend to be more durable, but the members will encounter problems of 
coordination. The optimal compromise, according to Kohl and Litt, lies in the form of “strategic 
centralization and tactical autonomy, a system that “leaves action units free to operate on their 
own initiative within guidelines established by a central command.”
107 
Grabosky’s description of the organizational structure of terrorist groups accurately 
reflects the structure of Hamas and PIJ’s military wings, as we shall see later.
108 A tightly 
arranged cellular structure with as little lateral and vertical communication as possible is 
especially important given the secrecy under which Palestinian organizations engaged in suicide 
terrorism act.  
                                                 
106 See P.N. Grabosky, “The Urban Context of Political Terrorism,” in Michael Stohl (ed.), The Politics of 
Terrorism, Third Edition (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1988), pp. 59-84. 
107 James Kohl and John Litt, Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1974), p.21-22, as 
quoted in P.N. Grabosky, “The Urban Context of Political Terrorism,” p. 63. 
108 It is likely that the structure of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, the military wing of Fatah who is responsible for a 
multitude of suicide bombings mainly in 2002, is similar to that of Hamas’ and PIJ’s military wings. However, little 
information exists about Fatah’s military wing to make a conclusive statement about that. 
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Rewards of Membership  
 
In most cases, members in groups and organizations expect to benefit from some type of 
material or immaterial reward. Within groups, benefits may vary from such immaterial rewards 
as social acceptance, or emotional affiliation with peers. This can result in a boost in self-esteem 
and a sense of pride in the group’s achievement, which in turn leads to self-confidence derived 
from the individual’s affiliation with the group.
109 Material benefits may include the provision of 
food, shelter, and clothing. 
The suicide bomber, of course, will be affiliated with the organization for a limited time 
only, yet it is clear that he expects certain rewards from his affiliation, be it to him or to his 
family after his death. In addition, it is probably true that for many suicide bombers, it is the 
reward they expect after their death that provide them with additional incentives to kill 
themselves. These post-mortem rewards, as we have seen, can be material and immaterial 
benefits to the shaheed’s family. Organizations will typically pay off the families of the suicide 
bomber after their son’s or daughter’s death. It will also be the organization that planned the 
suicide bombing that will make sure that the shaheed will achieve transcendental fame. Hence, 
one could argue that in the case of suicide bombers, the organization delays the delivery of the 
rewards to the suicide bomber until after his death.   
 
Group Forces and Psychology in Groups and Organizations 
 
Understanding group dynamics in relation to terrorism is important for the simple reason 
that most terrorist activities are performed by groups, rather than individuals. In addition, even a 
superficial understanding of organizational dynamics, including that of terrorist organizations, 
                                                 
109 See, for example, Marisa Reddy Pynchon and Randy Borum, “Assessing Threats of Targeted Group Violence: 
Contributions from Social Psychology,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law, Vol. 17, 1999, p. 349. 
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needs to take group forces into account. One link between organizational and group theory can 
be found in organizational psychology, since “the psychology of people in organizations,” as 
Alexander Haslam writes, “is shaped by group forces.”
110  
Individuals join terrorist organizations for a variety of reasons, including the belief that 
acting as part of an organization will advance their political goals. But joining a terrorist group 
can serve certain psychological needs as well: Individuals affiliate with others who share similar 
views, ideas and personalities, and they satisfy their need of belonging by developing a shared 
identity and commitment to a cause. In terrorist groups, individuals can legitimize their 
collective grievances as well as their violent remedies. By sharing their identity, they eliminate 
conflict among themselves, and by forming a coherent whole, they achieve a real or perceived 
sense of protection.
111  
Social psychology research has been particularly helpful in understanding the various 
effects that memberships in groups can have on individual behavior. Pynchon and Borum have 
summarized the key principles of group behavior into four categories: group attitudes and 
opinions; group decision-making; motivations to group action; and the diffusion of individual 
responsibility in a group context.
112  
Some of these principles are relevant to terrorist organizations. In terms of opinion, for 
example, individual opinions and attitudes tend to become more extreme in a group context—a 
                                                 
110 S. Alexander Haslam, Psychology in Organizations: The Social Identity Approach (London: SAGE Publication, 
Ltd., 2001), p. 27. 
111 Compare Jeffrey Ian Ross, “Beyond the Conceptualization of Terrorism: A Psychological-Structural Model of 
the Causes of this Activity,” in Craig Summers and Eric Markusen (eds.), Collective Violence: Harmful Behavior in 
Group and Governments (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 184. 
112 Marisa Reddy Pynchon and Randy Borum, “Assessing Threats of Targeted Group Violence: Contributions from 
Social Psychology,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law, Vol. 17, 1999, p. 343. 
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process called group polarization that results from the group members’ exposure to more 
extreme arguments, as well as from competition between group members.
113 
As far as group motivations are concerned, groups are subjected to an in-group/out-group 
bias, i.e. a need to see the group in a positive light, particularly when compared to other groups. 
This bias can lead to the stereotyping and dehumanization of members of other groups.
114  
 
Organizational Goals and Motives  
 
A discussion on the goals and motivations of organizations with respect to suicide 
bombings seems important because, as has been mentioned, both individual as well as 
organizational motives are factors in the overall motivation to perpetrate a suicide attack. 
Organizational motives, meanwhile, are closely linked to the goals of organizations in general. 
In 1938, Chester Barnard wrote that the function of the executive organization is to 
“maintain a system of cooperative effort,”
115 which includes the maintenance of communication, 
securing personnel loyalty, and the formulation of the organization’s purpose and objective, 
among other functions.
116 In his classic study Political Organizations that appeared thirty-five 
years later, James Q. Wilson extended Barnard’s definition of organizations. “Organizations tend 
to persist,” he wrote, by “producing and sustaining the cooperative effort,” which is threatened 
by a series of “strains” that include what we would today call a high turnover rate, fierce 
                                                 
113 Marisa Reddy Pynchon and Randy Borum, “Assessing Threats of Targeted Group Violence,” p. 344. 
114 Marisa Reddy Pynchon and Randy Borum, “Assessing Threats of Targeted Group Violence,” p. 345. 
115 Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 216. 
116 Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, pp. 216-234. 
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competition, and lackluster personnel.
117 Contemporary terrorism analysts agree that survival is a 
high, if not the highest priority for organizations, including for those involved in terrorism.
118   
  When discussing what motivates organizations, two factors appear overriding: on the one 
hand, the use of terrorism as a strategic choice; and on the other hand, the group’s ideological 
considerations. 
  Marsha Crenshaw argues convincingly that terrorism can at times be understood as an 
expression of a political strategy. Groups possess collective preferences, or values, Crenshaw 
writes, and “selects terrorism as a course of action from a range of perceived alternatives.” 
Groups make “reasonably regularized” decision making procedures, in which the effectiveness 
of terrorism as a course of action vis-à-vis other courses of action is the primary variable of 
measurement.
 119 Crenshaw is careful to add that strategic calculation is only one element “in the 
decision-making process leading to terrorism. But it is critical to include strategic reasoning as a 
possible motivation, at a minimum as an antidote to stereotypes of ‘terrorists’ as irrational 
fanatics.”
120 
  The second major element is ideology, which does not only play an important role in 
motivating the group, but also in strengthening group cohesion. Ideology is often believed to act 
as a guide to which the organizations and individuals that subscribe to it will stick by any means. 
Upon closer look, however, ideology is more malleable than might appear. Martin Seliger 
recognized this adaptability of ideology and distinguished between fundamental and operative 
                                                 
117 James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973), pp. 30-36. 
118 Jerrold M. Post, for example, argues that “for any group or organization, the highest priority is survival. This is 
especially true for the terrorist group,” in Jerrold M. Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic,” p. 38. The author is indebted to 
Jessica Stern for comments pertaining to this section.  
119 Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice,” in Walter 
Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism, p. 8. 
120 Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism,” p. 10. 
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ideology.
121 Fundamental ideology, according to Seliger, asserts the overall principles and 
determines the “final goals and the grand vistas.” Operative ideology consists of a line of 
arguments “whose purpose is to devise and justify the policies executed or recommended by a 
party, whether or not they deviate from the fundamentals. In the justification of policy in the 
operative dimension, description and analysis exert greater influence through the enhanced 
consideration paid to the norms of expediency, prudence, and efficiency, i.e. to technical 
prescriptions, which share in, or even replace, the centrality accorded to moral prescriptions in 
fundamental ideology.”
122  
  The separation of ideology into a ‘fundamental’ and a ‘pragmatic’ ideology has a parallel 
in organizational theory with respect to the organization’s goals. Here, the theory often 
distinguishes between ‘official goals’ on the one hand, and ‘operative goals’ on the other. 
Official goals tend to be more general because they provide a focus for the organization as a 
whole, and hence need to relate to a larger number of people. Operative goals “focus attention on 
the issues that require effort on the part of specific units and particular employees,”
 123 and are 
therefore more concrete. 
  The above discussion can provide a useful framework to think about the goals and 
motives of an organization that employs suicide terrorism. In the following, some of the concepts 
discussed above will be applied to the case of Hamas.  
  To understand the elements of Hamas’ official goals, as well as its fundamental ideology, 
we will refer to the Hamas Charter, which was published in August 1988.
124 From the second 
                                                 
121 Martin Seliger, Ideology and Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pp. 175-208. The author would like to 
thank Ehud Sprinzak for comments relating to this section.  
122 Martin Seliger, Ideology and Politics, p. 109. 
123 See, for example, Mary Jo Hatch, Organization Theory, pp. 120-121.  
124 The translation of the Hamas Charter used in this discussion can be found in the Journal of Palestine Studies, 
Vol. XXII, No. 4 (Summer 1993), pp. 122-134. 
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chapter in the charter, one can infer that the official goals of Hamas are the destruction of Israel 
and the establishment of an Islamic state in its place.
125 These official goals are based on the 
fundamental ideology, to use Seliger’s term, that “the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf 
(Trust) upon all Muslim generations till the day of Resurrection. It is not right to give it up nor 
any part of it.” It is further based on the belief that nationalism is an integral part of religious 
ideology,
126 and that “there is no solution to the Palestinian problem except Jihad.”
127 
  Looking at the history of the Hamas movement, however, one can discern certain 
aberrations from the movement’s official path—traces of the existence of operative goals on the 
one hand, and operative ideology on the other.  
  Following the signing of the Taba Accord in late September 1995, for example, the 
Hamas leadership in the West Bank and Gaza decided to suspend military attacks against Israel 
in order for the latter not to interrupt its withdrawal from occupied territories. An additional 
calculation had been that at a time when parties ran for the PA council, Hamas wanted to avoid 
upsetting the Palestinian public.
128 In another example, Mishal and Sela suggest that Hamas, 
after 1995, made an offer to PA to halt attacks against Israel if the PA would stop its persecution 
of members of Hamas’ military wing, Izz-al-Din al-Qassam. 
129 Such attempts by Hamas clearly 
ran counter to its official goals, and hence constitute a set of pragmatic, ‘operative’ goals. 
  Other operative goals of Hamas that come to mind include the derailment of the peace 
process, enhancing its prestige among Palestinians vis-à-vis the PA or other groups, increasing 
                                                 
125 Hamas Charter, Chapter Two, Article 9 (Goals), p. 125: The goal of the Islamic Resistance movement therefore 
is to conquer evil, break its will, and annihilate it so that truth may prevail… and so that the call may be broadcast 
over the Minarets (lit. Mosques) proclaiming the Islamic state.” 
126 See Hamas Charter, Chapter Three, Articles 11 (Strategy and Means) and 13 (Initiatives, Peace Solutions, and 
International Conferences). 
127 Hamas Charter, Chapter 3, Article 13. 
128 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 73. 
129 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas:, p. 74. 
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its appearance as a legitimate opposition,  promoting ties with the Islamic world, and defying the 
Israeli enemy’s real or perceived strength.   
  For an organization, a strong impact of their actions on the audience may serve as an 
operative goal, and even as a motive for action. Bruce Hoffman said that “terrorism and the 
media are bound together in an inherently symbiotic relationship, each feeding off and exploiting 
the other for their own purposes”
130 The terrorist organization is well aware of this relationship, 
and many organizations exploit this fact brilliantly.  
  Organizations are certainly aware of the psychological impact of acts of suicide 
terrorism, which may in itself be an operative goal. Hamas, for example, often announces a 
series of ten or more suicide bombings in order to increase the psychological pressure on 
Israelis.
131  
 
Palestinian Organizations Employing Suicide Terrorism  
Hamas – Izz-al-Din al-Qassam 
  Since the outset of the Second Intifada, no other Palestinian group has executed as many 
suicide attacks, and generated as many casualties among Israelis, as the radical Islamic 
organization Hamas (see Figures III and IV). Founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in Gaza in 
1988, in the midst of the first intifada, Hamas—the acronym for Harakat al-Muqawamah al-
Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement), and a word that means ‘zeal’ in Arabic—derives its 
ideological and organizational roots from the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement established in 
the 1920s in Egypt. 
                                                 
130 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 142. 
131 See, for example, “Hamas Military Wing Promises ‘Wave’ of Suicide Operations,” Palestinian Information 
Center, July 17, 2001, in FBIS-NES, Document ID GMP20010717000181. 
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  The objectives of Hamas can be divided into short-term and long-term goals. In the short 
term, Hamas aims at establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, while its long-
term goal remains the establishment of an Islamic state that would replace Israel. By adopting 
this order of objectives, Hamas, as Mishal and Sela have written, “effectively subordinated the 
former to the latter [objective] by emphasizing the provisional nature of any political settlement 
with Israel, thus achieving political flexibility without forsaking its ideological credibility.”
132  
At its outset, and until the founding of a military wing in late 1991, Hamas focused 
primarily on religious and charitable services, known as Da’wah. These services include 
administrative bodies that provide medical and educational services; religious services such as 
religious education and religious preaching; and services relating to workers and students. Until 
today, the Da’wah remains a central element of the Hamas movement, leading even some Israeli 
experts to claim, not without justification, that “Hamas is essentially a social movement.”
133 
  Hamas asserts that its political and military wings are separated, with no direct links 
between the two
134—a claim that appears to be founded.
135 The first squads of Hamas’s military 
wing, Izz-al-Din al-Qassam
136, were formed in early 1991, following a crackdown of Hamas’ 
military infrastructure by Israelis.  
                                                 
132 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, p. 3. 
133 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, p. vii. 
134 See for example “Hamas Leader Al-Rantisi on Netanya Attacks, Suicide Operations,” Doha Al Jazeera Satellite 
Channel Television, January 8, 2001, FBIS-NES, Document ID GMP20010108000280. 
135 See for example, Khaled Abu Toameh, “From Cradle to Grave,” Jerusalem Report, September 4, 1997, p.34. At 
the time of this writing (April 2002), Israel conducts a self-declared “war on terrorism,” in the course of which it has 
occupied several cities under Palestinian control, including Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Nablus. In the course of 
Operation “Defensive Shield”, as the operation has been labeled, Israel may find evidence that will lead to a 
reassessment of the nature of the relationship between Hamas’s political and military wings.  
136 The group’s name is based on Izz-al-Din al-Qassam, considered by most Palestinian Islamic movements as a 
heroic figure—a pioneer of the Palestinian armed resistance and the father of the armed Palestinian revolution. For 
information on Izz-al-Din al-Qassam the individual, see Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank 
and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad (Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 
98-101. 
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Izz-al-Din al-Qassam is responsible for most terrorist attacks executed in the name of 
Hamas ever since 1992. On April 13, 1994, the Brigades planned and executed the first major 
suicide bombing at the central bus station in the central Israeli town of Hadera, in which five 
people were killed.
137 Initial activities of Izz-al-Din al-Qassam had an internal focus, as the 
military wing kidnapped and executed Palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israel. In 
December 1991, Doron Shorshan became the first Israeli citizen to be killed by Izz-al-Din al-
Qassam.
138   
Izz-al-Din al-Qassam emerged out of two groups, that together constituted the first 
military arm of Hamas, the Majahadoun al-Falestinioun (Palestinian Holy Fighters), and the 
Jehaz Aman (Security Section). The Majahadoun al-Falestinioun served as a military apparatus 
for terrorist attacks, particularly against Israeli targets, whereas the Jehaz Aman collected 
intelligence against Palestinian collaborators. Within Jehaz Aman, a violent operational arm was 
formed, labeled Majmouath Jihad u-Dawa (Holy War and Sermonizing Group). The latter was 
responsible for punishing those collaborators and other internal elements that were identified by 
the Jehaz Aman.
139  
Both groups that together formed the early military arm of Hamas—the Palestinian Holy 
Fighters and the Security Section—were founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. The initial goal of 
the military wing of Hamas was to focus their struggle on “’heretics’ and collaborators, in 
accordance with the view of the Muslim Brotherhood that Jihad should come only after the 
                                                 
137 See “Suicide and Car Bombings in Israel since the Declaration of Principles,” Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
website, http://www.mfa.gov.il/ mfa/go.asp?MFAH0i5d0 
138 ICT, “Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement),” available at http://www.ict.org.il/ 
139 ICT, “Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement),” available at http://www.ict.org.il/ 
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purging of rivals from within.”
140 Additional goals were to set up a military infrastructure, which 
included, inter alia, the stockpiling of weapons and the recruitment of operatives. 
The January 5, 1996 assassination of Yihye Ayyash, the mastermind behind several 
suicide bombings that killed and injured scores of Israelis, sparked a renewed wave of suicide 
bombings that persisted until late 1997. In early 1998, after a harsh crackdown of Hamas’ 
military infrastructure by the Palestinian Authority, new insights into Izz-al-Din al-Qassam were 
gained. Interrogations of group members, many of which were from Nablus, revealed, according 
to Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela,  
“an extensive, compartmentalized, military apparatus, which maintained close contact 
with the Hamas headquarters in the Gaza Strip, Jordan, and Lebanon using advanced 
communications methods, including the internet. The activities of the Izz-al-Din al-Qassam 
squads were divided among several senior regional commanders, whose names were on Israel’s 
‘wanted’ list. They were constantly on the move from one district to another, assisted by the 
clergy and personnel of the mosques. These senior activists organized new military cadres and 
supervised their training for military operations.”
141 
 
As far as the recruitment for these operations is concerned, the hard core of Hamas uses 
the religious and social frameworks of the movement to staff its military wing’s personnel. To 
that end, Izz-al-Din al-Qassam activists try to identify young men with a particular dedication to 
religion, mostly in mosques, schools, and religious institutions. 
At the time of this writing, Hamas has claimed roughly half of all suicide attacks 
perpetrated against Israelis during the Second Intifada—more than any other Palestinian 
                                                 
140 Rivals included not only collaborators, but also drug dealers, sellers of pornography, and other elements accused 
by Hamas of acting against the principles of Islam. See ICT, “Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement),” available at 
http://www.ict.org.il/ 
141 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, p. 78. 
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organization (Fig. III). In the twenty-three attacks organized and executed by Hamas between 
September 2000 and the end of March 2002, some 110 Israelis were killed, and almost 1,000 
injured (Fig. IV). Hamas has demonstrated an extremely high lethality in its attacks, a fact that 
hints at the effective organization and information gathering capabilities, in addition to the large 
resources—both material and financial—that are at the group’s disposal. Accordingly, Hamas 
has been able to increase the numbers of Israeli casualties in almost every period under review. 
In the first quarter of 2002, for example, 47 Israelis were killed in three suicide attacks attributed 
to Hamas (Fig. V). Contrast this with Fatah’s eleven attacks in the same quarter, in which 
twenty-three Israelis were killed—half as many as in attacks attributed to Hamas (Figs. II, V). 
Hamas, unlike PIJ, has not focused its suicide attacks solely on civilian targets. At least 
six attacks have targeted Israeli military elements. (Fig. VI). Figures VII and VIII demonstrate 
Hamas’ dominance in the Gaza Strip, as the five suicide bombers who were from the Gaza Strip 
all belonged to Hamas. Similarly, the only five suicide attacks against targets in the Gaza Strip 
were all perpetrated by members of Hamas (Fig. IX).    
 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad – The Jerusalem Brigades 
Unlike Hamas, the radical Islamist organization Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Harakat al-
Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini) is dedicated exclusively to terrorist activities. Officially founded by 
Palestinian students in Egypt in 1980, PIJ, which is known for its secrecy and strict discipline, 
split from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood due to the latter’s “lack of revolutionary spirit and 
style.”
142 It was highly influenced by the 1979 Iranian revolution on the one hand, and the 
radicalization of Islamic student organizations in Egypt on the other.  
                                                 
142 See Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza, p. xvii, p. 93. 
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  Led by Fathi Shikaki until his assassination in Malta in 1995, PIJ is headed today by Dr. 
Ramadan Abdallah Shallah, a Gaza native educated in London, and with teaching experience at 
the South Florida University in Tampa, where he directed the World and Islam Studies 
Enterprise (WISE). 
143 The group maintains offices in Beirut, Tehran, Damascus, and Khartoum, 
and yields more influence in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, where Hamas clearly 
dominates. (Figs. VII, VIII) 
Hamas and PIJ both regard the ‘Palestinian problem’ as an Islamic problem rather than a 
national or merely Arab problem. The solution, as far as PIJ is concerned, is “an Islamic popular 
war of liberation, resulting in the destruction of Israel and the creation of an Islamic state in 
Palestine.”
144  
One of the fundamental differences between the PIJ and Hamas relates to the groups’ 
strategies. Hamas believes that Islam should spread across the society prior to the struggle for 
Palestine. In contrast, PIJ, which considers armed struggle the strategy for political action, does 
not believe the Islamic transformation of society to be a precondition for the liberation of 
Palestine and the establishment of an Islamic state within its borders.
 145  
For PIJ, the elimination of Israel is an immediate goal, and this goal can only be achieved 
through immediate jihad.  To spearhead this jihad, which should not be held off under any 
circumstances, PIJ sees itself as revolutionary Islamic vanguard capable to take on Israel in an 
all-out war.
146   
                                                 
143 See ICT, “Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” available at http://www.ict.org.il/ 
144 Elie Rekhess, “The Iranian Impact,” p. 11, quoted in Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank 
and Gaza, p. 105. 
145 See Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza, p. 106. 
146 See Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza, p. 120. 
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According to Israeli and U.S. experts, PIJ’s hard core consists of several cells numbering 
some several dozen members in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
147 Similar to Hamas, PIJ is also 
divided into a military and a political wing. In an interview with Beirut’s Al-Manar TV station in 
August 2001, PIJ leader Sheikh Ramadan Shallah said that it is PIJ’s military wing, the so-called 
Jerusalem Brigades,
148 that determines the timing, venue, and type of suicide attacks.  Shallah 
emphasized that “there is only one military wing and one fighting address under the banner of 
the Islamic Jihad Movement at this phase. It is the Al Quds Squads [i.e. Jerusalem Brigades]. It 
is the party I charge of carrying out operations in the name of [the] Islamic Jihad Movement.”
149  
  PIJ began to carry out suicide attacks in the early wave of suicide bombings that hit Israel 
between 1994 and 1997. On November 11, 1994, a Palestinian recruited by PIJ detonated 
himself while he was riding a bicycle, killing three Israelis. PIJ is also responsible for one of the 
most costly suicide attack in Israeli history. On January 22, 1995, two bombs that exploded 
consecutively killed eighteen Israeli soldiers and one civilian at the Beit Lid junction on the 
Israeli coastal plain.
150 
  Between the end of September 2000 and late March 2002—the initial eighteen months of 
the Second Intifada—the PIJ has been responsible for roughly a fourth of all suicide attacks (see 
att), killing at least eleven Israelis, and injuring 178 (Fig. III). Figure II shows that the number of 
attacks during the Second Intifada perpetrated by PIJ have been on a slow rise, reaching four 
attacks in the first quarter of 2002, leading to an increase in the number of killed and wounded 
by PIJ to eight and ninety-four, respectively, in the first quarter of 2002 (Figs. V, X). Figures VI 
                                                 
147 See Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Martyr Strategy,” p. 35. 
148 Also known as Al-Quds [Jerusalem] Brigades, Al-Quds Squads, or Jerusalem Squads. 
149 “Islamic Jihad Leader Interviewed on Jerusalem Operation, Beirut Al-Manar Television, August 9, 2001, in 
FBIS-NES, Document ID GMP20010809000114. 
150 See, for example, the website of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/ 
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and VIII show that PIJ targets predominantly civilian targets in Israel proper, including 
Jerusalem.  
 
Fatah, Tanzim, and the Al Aqsa Martyrs 
The third Palestinian organization to have employed suicide terrorism during the Second 
Intifada is Fatah, the dominant faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which in 
turn is headed by Yasser Arafat. As Figure III reveals, Fatah has been responsible for almost a 
quarter of all suicide attacks since the Second Intifada. Furthermore, Figure II reveals that Fatah 
has emerged into the most active organization in terms of numbers of attacks on Israelis. As a 
result of attacks by Fatah and affiliated organizations, 23 Israelis were killed, and 388 wounded 
between September 2000 and March 2002 (Fig. IV). 
The armed wing of Fatah is known as the Tanzim, a group that has been responsible for 
much of the violence that erupted in the months following Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple 
Mount. The Tanzim, Arabic for organization, is estimated to have between several hundred to a 
few thousand active members.
151 It is headed by Marwan al-Barghouti, the secretary-general of 
Fatah in the West Bank, who was arrested by Israeli forces in Ramallah on April 15, 2002. 
Yasser Arafat and the Fatah leadership set up the Tanzim in 1995 to consolidate the PA’s 
survival by curbing the influence of those elements believed to threaten, or potentially threaten, 
the survival of the PA. The latter elements include the Islamist groups, in particular Hamas. 
Tanzim, however, was set up not only to offset Hamas and other Islamist groups, but also to keep 
the PA’s own security services in check. The PA security services, who are controlled mainly by 
                                                 
151 See David Schenker, “Inside the Fatah Tanzim: A Primer,” PeaceWatch # 284, The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, October 6, 2000, available online at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ See also Ronni Shaked, 
“The Tanzim: Fatah’s Fighters on the Ground,” Yediot Ahronot, October 3, 2000, available on the website of the 
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/ 
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PLO officials who returned from exile in other Arab countries, are considered by many to be 
corrupt. In contrast, the Tanzim “is the stronghold of the ‘insiders’,” according to a study 
conducted by the International Policy Institute of Counter-Terrorism (ICT).
152  Being associated 
with the PLO ‘insiders’, the Tanzim is essentially a  grassroots organization that enjoys wide 
popularity among the Palestinian community.  
The activities of the Tanzim include the instigation and organization of anti-Israel 
demonstrations, in which armed Tanzim members often take up positions within Palestinian 
crowds, firing on Israeli soldiers from among them.
153 Other activities include shootings at IDF 
guard posts and border crossings, bombing attacks against IDF patrols, drive-by shootings and, 
most recently, suicide attacks.  
The first suicide attack in the course of the Second Intifada that has been attributed to 
Fatah’s Tanzim took place on January 17, 2002 in Hadera, when 24-year old Abdul Salaam 
Sadek Hassouneh, armed with a rifle and a suicide belt, killed six Israelis.
154 
Fatah’s Tanzim militia are critical of the terms of the Oslo process, yet do not seem to 
reject negotiations completely. The Tanzim have expressed their readiness for diplomatic 
cooperation with the United States and Europe under terms more acceptable to the Palestinians. 
Yet, as Tanzim leader Barghouti has assured, these aspirations have to be accompanied by 
“action on the ground”.
155  
As the Second Intifada continues, a Fatah faction calling itself the “Al Aqsa Martyr 
Brigades” has taken the forefront in suicide attacks. In the first quarter of 2002, this group was 
                                                 
152 See ICT, “Fatah Tanzim: The Organization,” available at http://www.ict.org.il/ 
153 See ICT, “Fatah Tanzim: The Organization,” available at http://www.ict.org.il/ 
154 On the responsibility of Tanzim in the attack, see for example Ze’ev Schiff, “Israel Warns Hamas: Don’t Use 
Rockets,” Ha’aretz (On-Line Edition), January 20, 2002.  
155 Quoted in Graham Usher, “Fatah’s Tanzim: Origins and Politics,” Middle East Report # 217, available at 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer217/217_usher.html/ 
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responsible for about half of all suicide attacks against Israelis, rendering the group more active 
than any other group, at least in the early part of 2002. (Fig. II) It is partly due to the growing 
influence of Fatah’s Al Aqsa Martyr Brigades that the State Department decided to put the group 
on its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) in March 2002.  
The Al Aqsa Martyr Brigades were formed after September 2000, and are assumed to 
consist of hundreds of members that are under the direct control of the Tanzim.
156 The links 
between Al-Aqsa and the PA leadership seem to be close. Maslama Thabet, a member of the 
Brigades, was quoted saying, “we are Fatah itself, but we don’t operate under the name Fatah. 
We are the armed wing of the organization. We receive our instructions from Fatah. Our 
commander is Yasser Arafat himself.”
157 According to a former FBI terrorism analyst, “the 
infrastructure, funds, leadership, and operatives that comprise the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and 
facilitate the group’s activity all hail from Fatah… Most of the Brigades’ leadership are salaried 
members of the PA and its security forces… Fatah is, by its own admission, Al-Aqsa’s parent 
and controlling organization.”
158  
Fatah’s formation of the Tanzim must be seen in the context of the attempt to channel and 
focus the passions of many Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza away from Islamist groups. 
Fatah’s success in doing so depends on Yasser Arafat’s standing in the public, which in turn is 
oscillating along with the political situation. Nevertheless, Fatah and the Tanzim are the most 
powerful secular force in the West Bank and Gaza, and offer a secular alternative to groups such 
as Hamas and PIJ.   
                                                 
156 See Serge Schmemann, “In the Arabs’ Struggle Against Israel, There are Many Players,” New York Times 
(Internet Edition), March 30, 2002. 
157 Matthew Levitt, “Designating the Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades,” PeaceWatch # 371, The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, March 25, 2002, available online at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ 
158 Matthew Levitt, “Designating the Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades,” PeaceWatch # 371. 
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The PFLP 
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is the other secular organization 
that has used suicide bombings during the recent violent clashes between Israelis and 
Palestinians. Founded in 1967 by George Habash, who resigned as the group’s leader in May 
2000, the PFLP is a Marxist Leninist terrorist organization that combines its leftist doctrine with 
Palestinian nationalism. On its website, for example, the PFLP asserts that it has a clear strategy 
for peace “which is characterized by its commitment to the creation of a democratic, pluralist 
state where the basic rights of all people are affirmed and protected. The first step in attaining 
this goal is to bring an end to the Israeli military occupation of Palestinian land.”
159 
Originally a member of the PLO, the group dissociated itself from the PLO completely 
after the 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles. It is believed to have roughly 800 
members, operating in Lebanon, Israel, Syria, and the PA. 
The group reached its pinnacle in the late 1960s and 1970s, when it carried out a number 
of spectacular airline hijackings. In the early months of the Second Intifada, the group was led by 
Abu Ali Mustafa, the successor of George Habash. Following a number of terrorist activities, 
including a number of lethal car bombings in Israeli cities, Mustafa was killed by the Israeli 
army on August 27, 2001. His succession by Ahmed Sadat, in October 2001, was seen as both a 
radicalization of the PFLP, as well as an attempt to consolidate the PFLP’s presence in the areas 
under PA control.
160 
Indeed, under Sadat, the PFLP seems to have achieved both. On October 17, 2001, the 
PFLP took responsibility for the assassination of right-wing Israeli Minister of Tourism 
Rehavam Ze’evi, in an apparent revenge for the killing of Mustafa. On February 16, 2002, the 
                                                 
159 PFLP Website, http://www.pflp-pal.org/faq.html/ 
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PFLP took responsibility for a suicide bombing that killed 2 Israelis and injured 29 at the West 
Bank settlement of Karnei Shomron. Roughly three weeks later, the PFLP sent a suicide bomber 
to a hotel lobby at the settlement of Ariel, where fifteen people were injured. 
 
Inter-Organizational Relationships 
Coalitions of organizations engaged in terrorist activity are a mixed blessing for the 
component groups. On the one hand, these coalitions have the potential to provide the individual 
groups with more and better resources. A coalition of terrorist groups is more likely to be 
innovative in terms of tactics than are individual organizations—“coalitions have the talents, 
resources, and weapons that are needed to commit new types of acts,” as K.L. Oots points out, 
particularly those acts that are difficult to plan and execute.
 161 
On the other hand, coalitions are difficult to organize. As stated by Edward Mickolus, 
three such difficulties include the need to meet quid pro quo arrangements; personality and 
ideological clashes that are likely to occur; and the requirement to “make more people aware of 
the plans, resources, and membership of a group. Coalitions, therefore, pose a greater security 
risk than do single group actions.”
162 
Coalitions as such do not exist between the groups that organize, execute, or provide 
logistical, financial, material, or moral support to acts of suicide terrorism, partly for the reasons 
described by Mickolus. Nevertheless, groups such as Hamas, Fatah, and PIJ have at times 
                                                 
161 See, for example, Kent Layne Oots, A Political Organization Approach to Transnational Terrorism, p. 114. 
162 Edward F. Mickolus, “Combatting International Terrorism: A Quantitative Analysis,” 1981 PhD Dissertation, 
Yale University, quoted in Kent Layne Oots, A Political Organization Approach to Transnational Terrorism, p. 
49/50. 
 
Suicide Bombings in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Conceptual Framework 
 Assaf Moghadam                                                                      Page 63 
cooperated with each other, and several of them have close relationships both among themselves 
as well as with other state or non-state actors.   
Following the Israeli army’s occupation of the West Bank city of Jenin in April 2002, 
several documents have been confiscated that suggest close operational cooperation in the Jenin 
area among Hamas and PIJ on the one hand, and Fatah, and PA security services on the other. 
That cooperation, according to IDF sources, includes cooperation in executing large-scale terror 
attacks in Israel. “The [PA’s] security apparatuses provide the PIJ early warning with regard to 
the PA's intentions to act against them, and supply arms to the Hamas and the PIJ,” according to 
the Israel Defense Forces website.
163  
In the past, Hamas and PIJ have had a peculiar relationship. Prior to the establishment of 
the Palestinian Authority, there were few connections between the two Islamist groups, and 
Hamas and PIJ in fact rivaled one another in the Gaza Strip. Limited cooperation on the 
operational level between Hamas and PIJ occurred only in the aftermath of the establishment of 
the Palestinian Authority, when Hamas began to employ tactics of suicide bombings.  One 
outcome was the suicide bombing at the Beit Lid junction mentioned above, in which the two 
groups cooperated to some extent. Following the assassination of Shikaki in 1995, the influence 
of PIJ in the West Bank and Gaza declined, leading to an improved relationship with Hamas. 
164   
Since the beginning of the Second Intifada, the two groups have cooperated on a very 
limited basis. PIJ leader Ramadan Shalah has expressed his disappointment at the lack of 
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coordination of the struggle against Israel, while expressing his willingness to reduce the gap 
between the organizations.
165  
Generally speaking, Hamas criticizes PIJ for a number of reasons. First, it accuses PIJ of 
being part of the Fatah movement, forming an ‘Islamic Fatah,’ and hence of a duplication in 
doctrine. Second, Hamas accuses PIJ of ignoring the importance of religious education. Third, 
Hamas has often decried the close relationship between PIJ and Iran, leading some Hamas 
members to accuse PIJ of being a Shi’ite organization, and of carrying out Iranian policies.
166 
  Ironically, Hamas itself has developed increasingly close ties to Iran, particularly since 
the 1991 Gulf War. Hamas set up a small office in Iran, and the latter is said to provide Hamas 
with several million dollars a year for sabotage operations against Israel.
167 
  Both Hamas and PIJ seem to have ties to Hizballah. One Hamas leader, Khaled Meshal, 
said shortly after the beginning of the Second Intifada that Hamas has “good relations with [its] 
Hizballah brothers, and the path of jihad and resistance unites and enhances efforts. We ask God 
to help us enhance cooperation among all parties.”
168 
  Representatives of all three organizations had a chance to meet during an “International 
Conference on the Palestinian Intifada” in Tehran in late April 2001. Al-Manar, the TV channel 
of Hizballah, has increased its coverage of the Palestinian issue, and is often the first source to 
identify the name, age, and affiliation of a Palestinian suicide bomber. Finally, Hizballah seems 
to coordinate its attacks on northern Israel with a deterioration in Israeli-Palestinian relations. 
                                                 
165 See, for example, “Islamic Jihad Leaders Interviewed on Suicide Missions, Financing,” Liberation, July 28, in 
FBIS-NES, Document ID EUP20010729000082. See also “Islamic Jihad Leader Vows to Adopt ‘Offensive 
Strategy’ Against Israel,” London MBC Television in Arabic, April 2, 2001, in FBIS-NES, Document ID 
GMP20010402000230.  
166 See Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza, p. 124. 
167 For a detailed discussion on Iranian connections to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, see Elie Rekhess, “The Terrorist 
Connection - Iran, the Islamic Jihad, and Hamas,” Justice, Volume 5, May 1995. 
168 “Hamas’ Mish’al on Israeli Aggression, Suicide Operations, PA Ties,” Al-Bilad (Jedda), October 13, 2000, in 
FBIS-NES, Document ID GMP20001015000212. See also “Hamas’s Mish’al: Jihad Palestinians’ Sole Option,” Al-
Zaman (London), November 23, 2000, in FBIS-NES, Document ID GMP20001123000110. 
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During Israel’s occupation of several West Bank cities in April 2002, for example, Hizballah 
increased its attacks on northern Israel, in an apparent attempt to provoke Israel into escalating 
the conflict.   
Hamas’ attitude towards the PLO has also been ambivalent. As an Islamic organization 
that attempts to place the Palestinian struggle in a religious context, Hamas clearly competes 
with Yasser Arafat’s PLO for support among ordinary Palestinians. At the same time, Hamas has 
persistently avoided intra-Palestinian violence and has expressed its willingness to consider at 
least a temporary ceasefire with Israel—proving that the organization is led not only by doctrinal 
considerations, but makes pragmatic calculations.
169 
As far as the PIJ is concerned, it has relatively close ties to Yasir Arafat’s Fatah 
movement, and reasonably close ties to the PFLP. As far as state sponsors are concerned, PIJ 
enjoys, beside Iranian support, close ties with Damascus. In September 1999, during a 
crackdown against Hamas by Jordanian royal troops, PIJ protested the crackdown out of its 
Damascus office, in cooperation with the PFLP, Fatah, and other groups.
170. 
The Organizations and their Tactics   
Suicide Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare  
The latest round of violence between Israelis and Palestinians has often been referred to 
as asymmetric warfare. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the concept of asymmetric warfare 
entails more than merely asymmetric military capabilities. It involves asymmetric values, 
asymmetric pressures, and asymmetric goals. Combined with qualitatively and quantitatively 
different military capabilities, these asymmetries lead to the use of asymmetric tactics.  
                                                 
169 See especially the chapter on “Controlled Violence,” Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 
pp. 49-82. 
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In the course of the Second Intifada, Palestinian groups have used a wide range of 
asymmetric tactics, including kidnappings, guerrilla warfare, shootings on military installations 
and civilian populations, the launching of mortar grenades and recently of ‘Qassem II’ rockets. 
Militant Palestinians have planted numerous roadside and car bombs.  
In asymmetric warfare, the respective sides use those tactics that are in their comparative 
advantage, in order to exploit their enemy’s relative weaknesses and real or perceived 
vulnerabilities. Generally speaking, asymmetric warfare implies that one side is either incapable 
(usually the weaker side) or unwilling (usually the stronger side) to use tactics similar to its  
opponent.
171 Further, the stronger side will usually concentrate on the enemy’s ability to fight, 
while the weaker side will attempt to break the enemy’s will to fight.
172  
The weaker side, which is our focus here, will usually attempt to achieve its goal of 
breaking its enemy’s will to fight by relying on at least some of the following methods: using 
tactics and weapons in ways that are difficult to prevent or defend against; employing the 
element of surprise; altering the battle space; attempting to employ all segments of its society; 
and targeting large segments of the enemy’s population.  
In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, terrorist organizations utilize all of the above methods. 
By choosing suicide bombings, Palestinian terrorist organizations have adopted a tactic that is 
inherently difficult to defend against; that enjoys the element of surprise that characterize all 
bombing attacks; and that targets the entire Israeli population in a most indiscriminate manner. 
As has been shown, the use of suicide bombings enjoys widespread support among ordinary 
Palestinians. Finally, it is accompanied by an attempt to alter the battle space, in two respects: 
                                                 
171 Compare Kevin O’Brien and Joseph Nusbaum, “Intelligence Gathering Asymmetric Threats – Part One,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, October 12, 2000, available online at 
http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/usscole/jir001012_1_n.shtml 
172 See, for example, Avigdor Haselkorn, “Martyrdom: The Most Powerful Weapon,” Los Angeles Times, December 
3, 2000, p. 5. 
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first, it brings the conflict to Israeli cities, targeting mostly large population centers in Jerusalem 
and other Israeli cities (Fig. XIII). Second, most Palestinian terrorist groups attempt to mobilize 
the larger Arab and Islamic world to support their battle against Israel.  
The weaker side attempts to achieve its goal of breaking the enemy’s will to fight by 
instilling the element of fear in the society of the stronger side (Figs. XIV and XVI, f.ex., reveal 
that 78% and 72% of suicide bombings target Israeli civilians in Israel proper, including 
Jerusalem. Figs. XV and XVII reveal that the number of suicide attacks against civilians as well 
as against targets in Israel proper, including Jerusalem, are increasing). Abid al-Haleem Izaldain, 
for example, a PIJ leader based in Jenin, said that the real purpose of a “martyrdom operation” is 
that “it evens out the balance of fear even if it does not balance the military.”
173 Sheikh Ahmed 
Yassin was quoted saying that “The Israelis…will fall to their knees…You can sense the fear in 
Israel already; they are worried about where and when the next attacks will come. Ultimately, 
Hamas will win.”
174 Balancing out this element of fear is attempted through the systematic 
demoralization of the Israeli society, while exposing the powerlessness of the stronger side’s 
government. At the same time, the martyr’s zeal furthers his status as a role model and hence 
serves as inspiration to other potential volunteers.  
Leaders of Palestinian terrorist organizations often justify the use of suicide bombings as 
a tactic used by a weaker side against the stronger side. One Hamas leader, Khaled Meshal, told 
an interviewer that the Palestinian people “are fighting with the tools they possess. They possess 
stones, and, therefore, they fight by using them. Had they possessed weapons, they would fight 
                                                 
173 Vivienne Walt, “Dying for a Cause: West Bank Town Sees Sons Become Suicide Bomber,” Newsday, August 
20, 2001, p. A5. 
174 Quoted in Burhan Wazir, “Suicide Bombing is Democratic Right, Says the ‘Soul’ of Hamas,” Observer, August 
19, 2001, p. 20. 
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with them.” 
175 A comment by Ramadan Shalah demonstrates the attempt at demoralizing and 
intimidating the Israeli enemy: “Our enemy possesses the most sophisticated weapons in the 
world and its army is trained to a very high standard. We have nothing with which to repel 
killing and thuggery against us except the weapon of martyrdom,…” the PIJ leader said. “It is 
easy and costs us only our lives…human bombs cannot be defeated, not even by nuclear 
bombs.”
176  
Tactical Advantages of Suicide Terrorism 
Whether Ramadan Shalah is correct in claiming that “human bombs cannot be defeated” 
remains to be seen. It is less doubtful that terrorist organizations use suicide bombings with 
increased frequency, as Figure XVIII illustrates. One reason for this rise might be that 
organizations are increasingly aware of the distinct tactical advantages that this modus operandi 
offers.  
Suicide attacks offer a better means of protection to the organization than do other 
attacks. Organizations do not need to engage in the process of planning an escape route—a 
highly problematic element of most ordinary terrorist attacks. Similarly, suicide attacks minimize 
the risk that suicide bombers will be caught, interrogated, and coerced into disclosing 
information about the sponsoring organization.
177    
“Suicide attacks result in many casualties and cause extensive damage,” writes Israeli 
terrorism expert Boaz Ganor (see also Figs. XII and XIII) This is achieved mainly because the 
attack can be executed “at the most appropriate time and place with regard to the circumstances 
at the target location,” guaranteeing the maximum number of casualties when compared to other 
                                                 
175 “Hamas’s Mishal: Jihad Palestinians’ Sole Option,” Al-Zaman (Arabic), November 23, 2000, p. 4, FBIS-NES, 
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176 Quoted in Ehud Sprinzak, “Rational Fanatics,” p. 68. 
177 See Boaz Ganor, “Suicide Attacks in Israel,” in ICT, Countering Suicide Terrorism, p. 137. 
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bombs, such as time bombs or remotely controlled explosives. “In this regard,” Ganor writes, 
“the suicide bomber is no more than a sophisticated bomb—a carrier that brings the explosive 
device to the right location and detonates it at the right time.”
178 
The suicide attacker who sets out on a mission is virtually guaranteed to be successful, as 
it is difficult for security personnel to prevent the bomber from detonating his device, even if he 
is identified in advance. That said, there are cases in which suicide bombers have been 
intercepted, or other cases when their explosive devices failed to detonate. In fact, Israeli security 
forces are relatively successful in intercepting Palestinian suicide bombers, by snatching them 
before they set out on their missions, or by targeting them on their way to the target areas using 
remotely controlled devices or helicopter gunships.
179  
Suicide operations are also very cost-effective, with the total price of an operation 
averaging  about one hundred and fifty dollars.
180 Nasra Hassan quotes a Palestinian security 
official who points out that, “apart from a willing young man, all that is needed is such items as 
nails, gunpowder, a battery, a light switch and a short cable, mercury (readily obtainable from 
thermometers), acetone, and the cost of tailoring a belt wide enough to hold six or eight pockets 
of explosives.”
181  
Finally, suicide bombings have a major impact on the media, drawing many viewers to 
the television sets. As a result, the organizers of the attack meet an additional goal in reaching a 
large audience, and in increasing the element of fear they hope to instill on the target population. 
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Brian Jenkins wrote in 1976 that “Terrorism is theatre,”
182 and this seems particularly true in the 
case of suicide terrorism.  
Recruitment, Training, and Indoctrination 
Recruitment 
Relatively few open sources to date reveal the methods employed by groups such as 
Hamas, PIJ, or Fatah to recruit, train, and indoctrinate Palestinians that have been selected for 
suicide missions. From the little open sources that are available, it appears that Hamas, PIJ, and 
Fatah have relatively similar processes of selection, recruitment, and training. 
  Typically, organizations will reject volunteers, and will select the candidates for suicide 
missions themselves. Organizations such as Hamas and PIJ generally hesitate to accept 
volunteers for a variety of reasons: First, there are simply too many volunteers. Second, 
candidates are chosen on the basis of religious devotion, trust, and the ability to keep a secret, 
and recruiters will naturally prefer to pick candidates that they have known for a longer period of 
time. Third, there is always a fear by the organizations that Israelis will attempt to plant 
collaborators into the organization.
183  
                                                
In an article that appeared in the journal Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Harvey 
Kushner described the selection process as follows: 
 
The selection process begins with members of the Izzadin el-Kassam or even the Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad circulating among the organizations’ schools and mosques during religious 
instruction. The recruiters broach the subject of dying for Allah with a group of students and 
 
182 Brian Michael Jenkins, “International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict,” in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf 
(eds.), International Terrorism and World Security (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 16. 
183 See article by Ron Ben-Yishai, “Anatomy of a Suicide,” Yediot Aharonot, January 27, 1995 (Hebrew). 
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watch the students’ reactions. Students that seem particularly interested are immediately singled 
out for possible special merit.
184  
 
In selecting the potential shaheeds, Hamas and other groups seem to place particular 
importance on several characteristics: the religiosity of the recruits; a clean criminal record so as 
not to raise the suspicions of Israel’s secret service;
185 the ability to withstand severe 
psychological pressure; and the ability of the recruit to keep a low profile.  
Recruiters of PIJ insist that they do not select candidates who have a tendency to be 
suicidal. In an interview with the New Yorker, PIJ member Abdullah Shami told a reporter that 
PIJ does not recruit “depressed” people. “If there were a one-in-a-thousand chance that a person 
was suicidal, we would not allow him to martyr himself. In order to be a martyr bomber, you 
have to want to live.”
186 
Shami and other PIJ members recruit their activists not only in mosques, but also in 
university campuses, through social activities, and even in Israeli jails. Ziad Abu-Amr, for 
example, writes that the PIJ leadership has been highly successful in recruiting new members in 
Israeli jails, and even suggests that this was one reason why the Israeli government began to 
deport PIJ leaders, rather than keeping them behind bars.
187 
Religion, meanwhile, is an important element not only for Hamas and Islamic Jihad, but 
also for the secular Fatah. In late March 2002, an article appeared in the Sunday Times that 
claimed to feature an interview with several members of Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, 
including a ‘living martyr’. According to ‘Abu Fatah,’ the living martyr’s commander, Al-Aqsa 
recruits volunteers who are “reasonably religious, convinced of the meaning of ‘martyrdom and 
                                                 
184 Harvey Kushner, “Suicide Bombers: Business as Usual,” p. 332. 
185 See Jack Kelley, quoting ‘Hamas’, in “The Secret World of Suicide Bombers,” USA Today, June 26, 2001, p. 1A 
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jihad’. When picking a candidate, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, according to the Sunday Times 
article, sticks to the following rules:  
 
“Anyone under 18 is rejected; so are married men with children and anyone without a 
sibling who may be a family’s sole breadwinner. Those who excel militarily and show steely 
composure in stressful situations are most likely to be chosen. They…should also be of build and 
shape that will enable them to move easily among Israelis—disguised if necessary in skull cap 
and wig, with ringlets down the side of the face—as they wait for the moment to strike.”
188   
 
  Interesting as these insights into Al-Aqsa’s criteria for choosing a candidate are, they 
should be read with caution. A recent female suicide bomber, Ayat Akhras, for example, was 
only sixteen years old when she detonated herself in front of an Israeli supermarket in March—
two years below Al-Aqsa’s alleged ‘threshold’. Further, Israelis certainly differ in ‘size and 
shape,’ hence the need for a candidate to resemble the Israeli in “size and shape” seems murky. 
 
Training and Indoctrination 
 
The training and indoctrination of the ‘candidate for martyrdom’ are among the core 
tasks of organizations that use suicide bombings as a tactic. Here, too, little reliable and 
unclassified information is available.  
Most suicide bombers undergo between several weeks to several months of training,
189 
although that period can differ, depending on the urgency of the timing and the degree of 
pressure exerted on the organization. One high-ranking IDF official pointed out that the threat of 
assassination, for example, disrupts the smooth planning of suicide attacks, as the organizers are 
                                                 
188 Hala Jaber, “Inside the World of the Palestinian Suicide Bomber,” Sunday Times (London), March 24, 2002. 
189 See Ariel Merari, quoted in Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, p. 78. 
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obliged to spend more time on their personal safety, and hence have less time available planning 
and organizing suicide attacks.
190  
During the training period, the candidates are subjected to both religious indoctrination 
and anti-Israeli propaganda. Volunteers attend classes, usually between two and four hours a day, 
where emphasis is placed on those parts of the Quran and Hadith that glorify martyrdom, and 
that are promised the benefits of the afterlife.
191 Harvey Kushner adds that “students are assigned 
various tasks to test their commitment: delivering weapons for use in clandestine activities is a 
popular way to judge the student’s ability to follow orders and keep a secret.”
192 
Besides indoctrination, the candidate will also undergo a process of cleansing and 
spiritual purification while he is being trained. He will go on lengthy fasts, will spend most of the 
nights praying; pay off all his debts; and ask for forgiveness for sins and offenses he may or may 
not have committed.
193 
When the candidate for the suicide mission is indoctrinated, has proven to understand and 
believe in the relevant parts of the Quran, and has manifested his courage as well as his ability to 
keep a secret, he will usually go through several final stages, shortly before he will embark on 
his or her mission.  
  In most cases, the candidate will ‘disappear’, leaving his home and family without a 
trace.
194 During this time, he will undergo intensive training for several days, and will acquaint 
                                                 
190 Author’s interview with a high-ranking IDF official. 
191 The martyr is particularly encouraged to read six specific chapters of the Quran that feature such themes as jihad, 
the birth of the nation of Islam, war, Allah’s favors, and the importance of faith. See Nasra Hassan, “An Arsenal of 
Believers,” p. 41. 
192 Harvey Kushner, “Suicide Bombers: Business as Usual,” p. 333. 
193 Nasra Hassan, “An Arsenal of Believers,” p. 41. 
194 In a recent article on the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, one candidate was said to have spoken to his mother while 
under training. There is not enough information available at this point to establish whether this was an outlier case, 
or whether Fatah’s training is less stringent than that of Hamas and PIJ, enabling the candidate to stay in touch with 
his family throughout the process. See Hala Jaber, “Inside the World of the Palestinian Suicide Bomber,” Sunday 
Times (London), March 24, 2002. 
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himself with most operational aspects of his mission, including how to detonate the explosive 
device.
195  
In rare cases, the training at this stage will also involve mock burials of one or several 
candidates, in order to test their readiness to die by showing no fear of death. In an article that 
appeared in 1995, a Palestinian intelligence officer told a Newsweek reporter how Hamas  
 
“put two or three people together in the grave and cover[ed] it, as if they were really dead. After 
two or three minutes they let them out. Then they determine who is the strongest among them, 
and later they put the chosen one in the grave by himself. They tell him to recite a special part of 
the Quran…Then they get him out. They leave him for two days and nights by himself. He sees 
nobody, nothing; he’s totally alone, just reading the Quran. Then they study him to see if he’s 
ready. They tell him: ‘Now you are great, you are holy, you are ready to go to heaven’.” 
196 
 
  In the last days before the bombing, the candidate will prepare his will in the form of a 
letter, audio tape, or video cassette, shot against the background of the sponsoring organization’s 
banner. He will usually pose with the Quran in one hand, and a gun or a bomb in the other. In the 
video recording, the martyr will usually praise the holy war and call upon his brethren to follow 
his example. He then will watch the tape over and over again in order to familiarize himself with 
his impending mission.
197 Just before the bomber sets out on his mission, Nasra Hassan writes, 
 
He performs a ritual ablution, puts on clean clothes, and tries to attend at least one communal 
prayer at a mosque. He says the traditional Islamic prayer that is customary before battle, and he 
                                                 
195 Compare Boaz Ganor, “Suicide Attacks in Israel,” p. 140. According to Ganor’s excellent study, the bomber will 
understand all operational aspects during this stage. However, there are indications, which will be mentioned later, 
that the suicide bomber will be unaware of the location and type of attack until the very last moments before his 
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asks Allah to forgive his sins and to bless his mission. He puts a Quran in his left breast pocket, 
above the heart, and he straps explosives around his waist or picks up a briefcase of a bag 
containing the bomb. The planner bids him farewell with the words ‘May Allah be with you, may 
Allah give you success so that you achieve Paradise.’ The would-be martyr responds, “Inshallah, 
we will meet in Paradise.’” 
 
The purpose of the recruitment, training, and indoctrination process is for the 
organization to reach its goal of staging a terrorist attack, while minimizing the risks involved. 
These include the risk of failure, of group exposure, and of wasting resources. The organization 
attempts to achieve its objectives by recruiting the right candidates—those who remain terse and 
are committed to secrecy—and by training and indoctrinating these individuals. Both training 
and indoctrination involve the mental preparation to commit a highly violent act that entails 
one’s one death. To that end, the organization instills the candidate with religious and political 
indoctrination, in the course of which the terrorist act will be given a moral, political, and 
religious justification.  
According to Ariel Merari, the organization and the individual form some kind of ‘social 
contract’ that the candidate will find difficult, if not impossible, to break. The contract can be 
sealed at the end of a three-pronged process: First, long meetings between the trainee and 
trainers. During these ‘peptalks’, several issues are discussed: the humiliation suffered as a result 
of the Israeli occupation; early Arab glory, juxtaposed with the current state of Arab and Islamic 
affairs; the glorification of martyrdom as a heroic act; and the benefits of being a martyr. Second, 
organizations use methods of group pressure. Third, the individual is compelled to commit 
himself personally and publicly by videotaping himself.
198   
                                                 
198 Lecture by Ariel Merari at the Fletcher School, in Assaf Moghadam, “Fletcher Hosts Ariel Merari, Israeli Expert 
on Suicide Terrorism,” Fletcher Ledger, February 4, 2002, available at http://www.fletcherledger.com/archive/2002-
02-04/020402-NfinalSuicideTerrorism.htm/ 
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Group leaders are well aware that group pressure, peptalks, and the recording of a 
videotape will all but seal the shaheed’s fate. For organizations, preventing the candidate from 
changing his mind in the last moment is a top priority. By employing these forms of pressure, the 
organizations achieve their goal, since the shaheed comes to understand that a sudden change of 
mind would be tantamount not only to betrayal, but also to shame. The shaheed reaches, as 
Merari says, a “point of no return.” “From then on, he is the living martyr.”
199 
Planning and Execution 
  Suicide bombers are usually sent out to perpetrate the attacks relatively soon after the 
training and indoctrination period, for three main reasons: first, for a fear that they might change 
their mind; second, because the longer they are living martyrs, the higher the chances that they 
will let other people in on their secret; third, the longer they wait, the higher the chance that 
Israelis will intercept the suicide bombers.  
  The execution of any suicide bombing is an extremely secretive and carefully planned 
act, regardless of the sponsoring organization. Once the decision to perpetrate an attack has been 
made, the organization needs to gather intelligence, assemble the bombing material, and organize 
the departure for the attack target selection.
200 
Weapon procurement: Most of the materials used in suicide bombings come from Egypt, 
where they are smuggled into the Gaza Strip either by sea or in underground tunnels. The seizure 
of the Karine-A ship in early 2002 suggested that Iran is another major supplier of weapons to 
the Palestinians. Among the weapons confiscated by an Israeli naval commando on the night of 
                                                 
199 Assaf Moghadam, “Fletcher Hosts Ariel Merari, Israeli Expert on Suicide Terrorism,” Fletcher Ledger, February 
4, 2002, available at http://www.fletcherledger.com/archive/2002-02-04/020402-NfinalSuicideTerrorism.htm/ 
200 See Boaz Ganor, “Suicide Attacks in Israel,” in ICT, Countering Suicide Terrorism, pp. 141.  
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January 3, 2002 were about 1.5 tons of explosives believed by the Israeli military intelligence to 
have been destined for use in suicide bombings.
201 
Division of Labor and Compartmentalization: To guarantee the secrecy of the attack 
plan, the planning stage is highly compartmentalized. According to a report in the Israeli daily 
Yediot Aharonot, the process is divided as follows: The organizational leadership is the top 
decision-making body, and decides on the need to execute a suicide attack. Next comes the 
operator, who is responsible for the selection of the shaheed as well as his aides. The aides, in 
turn, will bring in the explosives, organize the means of transportation, and provide all other 
necessary items such as fake identity cards, Israeli army uniforms, wigs, or other means of 
camouflage. It is the operator who will eventually assemble the electronic apparatus for the 
explosive, which needs to be easy to operate.
202   
The so-called martyrdom cell  (Al khaliyya al istishhadiyya) is the fundamental unit that 
organizes each suicide attack, and is tightly compartmentalized. The cell consists of the operator 
and two or three aides. The cell members, each of whom bears the title al shaheed al hayy (the 
living martyr), do not disclose their membership in the cell to their families and friends. Neither 
do they know the identity of their other cell members, except for that of the leader. At the end of 
each attack, the martyrdom cell is dissolved.
203 
The suicide bomber and the other cell members do not know the exact location of the 
attack, both for security reasons, as well as to prevent the suicide bomber from visiting the place 
                                                 
201 See, for example, Yossi Klein Halevi, “Stop Terror at its Source: Iran,” Los Angeles Times, January 8, 2002, 
p.11. 
202 See Ron Ben-Yishai, “Anatomy of a Suicide,” Yediot Aharonot, January 27, 1995 (Hebrew). 
203 Nasra Hassan, “An Arsenal of Believers,” p. 41. 
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in advance. The organization is concerned that the suicide bomber who would visit the location 
in advance could change his mind about carrying out the operation due to a bad conscience.
204  
   The suicide bomber will often be disguised as a religious Jew, an Israeli soldier, or a 
tourist. He will often have an easy enough time crossing from the West Bank into Israel, given 
the highly porous nature of the Green Line.  It is generally more difficult to cross the border from 
the Gaza Strip to Israel, which explains why only five attacks (or 10% of all attacks) in the first 
eighteen months of the Second Intifada have been perpetrated in Gaza, by Gazans. (Figs. IX, XI). 
Target Selection: Israeli interrogations of suicide bombers have shed some light on some 
of the operational methods used by suicide bombers. According to a report in the Israeli daily 
Ha’aretz, Israeli interrogations of suicide bombers whose attacks have been foiled established 
that the shaheeds were instructed to target large public shopping or leisure venues; to attack 
crowds or civilians; to synchronize the detonation of an explosive with the gathering of a line at 
the entrance to a large public venue; and to avoid security check areas by finding an area at some 
distance from security personnel.
205  
It will remain to be seen whether groups such as Hamas will make sophisticated attempts 
to combine toxic elements in the explosive mix of the suicide bomber. To date, at least three 
suicide bombings have given Israelis reason for concern: On May 18, 2001, Mahmud Ahmed 
Marmash, who detonated himself in front of a shopping mall in Netanya, was found to carry 
Hepatitis B. Several weeks later, the suicide bomber of a Tel Aviv nightclub, Saeed Hotari, was 
                                                 
204 See Ron Ben-Yishai, “Anatomy of a Suicide,” Yediot Aharonot, January 27, 1995 (Hebrew). 
205 Amos Harel, “Suicide Bombers Instructed to Aim for the Front of the Line,” Ha’aretz (On-Line Edition), July 16, 
2001. 
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also found to carry Hepatitis B.
206 Following the findings of the Abu Kabir Forensic Institute, the 
Israeli government decided to vaccinate all victims of terrorist attacks against Hepatitis B.
207 
  Finally, in early December 2001, a suicide bomb that went off in downtown Jerusalem 
was found to have contained rat poison. Although investigators established that the poison burnt 
in the explosion, Israeli intelligence chiefs were quoted saying that they believed Palestinian 
bomb-makers were trying to acquire lethal toxins for future suicide attacks.
208 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The purpose of this study was twofold. The first was to offer a framework of analysis for 
understanding suicide terrorism as an individual and organizational phenomenon. Second, to 
apply the model to the case of Palestinian suicide terrorism in the first eighteen months of the 
Second Intifada, October 2000 until March 2002. 
The model introduced here is based on the assumption that the phenomenon of suicide 
terrorism needs to be understood both from the individual and the organizational level. An 
organization without volunteers will not be able to translate its goals into practice, while an 
individual who is willing to die and to kill would normally lack the resources, information, and 
logistical capacity to turn his intentions into deeds.  
The model offered here argues that there are different sets of motivations emanating from 
both the individual and from the organization. Organizational motives should be understood as 
the organization’s intention to organize suicide attacks based on their political and tactical 
                                                 
206 Efrat Milner, “Israel: Bombers were Hepatitis B Carriers; Denies Visa Issued to Tel Aviv Bomber,” Yediot 
Aharonot, June 7, 2001, in FBIS-NES, Document ID GMP20010607000089. 
207 “Israel: All Victims of Terrorist Attacks to be Vaccinated against Hepatitis B,” Ma’ariv, August 14, 2001, in 
FBIS-NES, Document ID GMP20010814000071. 
208 Daniel McGrory, “Israel Fears Chemical Attack by Hamas Suicide Bombers,” Times, January 2, 2002. 
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considerations. At the same time, Palestinian individuals are subjected to a different set of 
motives—sociological, religious, nationalist, personal, or psychological—that result in the 
generation of a willingness to die. The model offered here argues that at the recruitment stage, 
the individual’s willingness to die merges with the organization’s willingness to kill. It is from 
this point on that the ‘volunteer for martyrdom’ becomes institutionalized and undergoes strict 
training and indoctrination. The goal of this process is to make sure that the volunteer is entirely 
committed to becoming a martyr. This second phase results in the actual suicide attack.  
Regarding the motivations of those Palestinians that volunteer for suicide missions, two 
major conclusions can be reached: First, most of the Palestinian individuals who volunteer for 
suicide missions seem to be influenced by several motivations at once, although the exact 
combination of these motivations varies from case to case. Therefore, one volunteer for 
martyrdom may be affected by, say, religious and national motives, while another may be more 
influenced by personal benefits, and may have been more susceptible to group pressure at the 
same time. It is impossible to trace the exact combination of motives because some of the 
motives are difficult to distinguish from each other, and in fact often feed on one another. It is 
difficult, for instance, to separate out economic from personal motives when it is clear that 
economic distress has a bearing on the individual’s dignity, or may create an urge for him to 
exact revenge against those sources he holds responsible for his misery. 
Second, it is unlikely—although not impossible—that a single motive among those 
identified would be sufficient for a Palestinian individual to be willing to sacrifice his life. 
Nationalist and economic motives alone, for example, are not sufficient explanations as to why 
groups will use suicide bombings as a tactic. Many other nations are struggling for national self-
determination without resorting to suicide terrorism, and the existence of economic hardships is a 
 
Suicide Bombings in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Conceptual Framework 
 Assaf Moghadam                                                                      Page 81 
global phenomenon that does not always lead to a ‘culture’ of suicide bombings. The same can 
be said of religious motives, especially when it is considered that few Arab or Islamic 
countries—including those that host a relatively large number of radical Islamists—are subjected 
to suicide bombings.  
More important may be the fact that the conflict bears a strong religious dimension, 
which manifests itself in the fact that the terms Israeli, Jew, and Zionist are used virtually 
interchangeably. Unfortunately, a deep-seated animosity towards Jews seems likely to serve as as 
additional incentive to commit acts of suicide terrorism. Indeed, antisemitism seems to become 
an increasingly dominant feature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
  It seems painfully obvious that many Palestinian suicide bombers believe that the benefits 
of becoming a martyr outweigh the costs. Becoming a martyr, many believe, is the fulfillment of 
a religious command. It provides an escape out of the humiliation sensed by most Palestinians. It 
provides the suicide bomber and his family with a multitude of tangible and intangible benefits, 
and offers an afterlife in paradise that is obviously preferred to life in such depressing refugee 
camps as Khan Yunis, Jebalya, and others. It bestows upon the Palestinian youth a sense of 
achievement, and it offers him an opportunity to stand out from the crowd. It offers him a way to 
exact revenge on the despised Israeli/Jewish enemy while humiliating him and exposing his 
weaknesses. Last, but not least, he is fighting for his homeland, which he believes was illegally 
taken away from him and his family. A ‘cost-benefit analysis’ undertaken by the ‘volunteer for 
martyrdom’, therefore, may result in the shaheed’s conviction that martyrdom is a tempting, 
even attractive, option; and that the rewards that martyrdom offers come at a relatively low price. 
That price may or may not include a mourning family. But, then again, the shaheed is probably 
convinced that he will rejoin his loved ones in heaven anyway. 
 
Suicide Bombings in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Conceptual Framework 
 Assaf Moghadam                                                                      Page 82 
Aware of what motivates the potential martyrs, organizations seek out candidates that 
have the highest promise to achieve the organization’s goals while minimizing the risks of 
failure, exposure, and the wasting of resources. The purpose of the training and indoctrination 
process, meanwhile, is to prepare the candidate mentally by instilling him with religious and 
political propaganda that will justify his deed, while committing him to the act through peptalks, 
the shooting of videotapes, and group pressure.  
The breadth of motivations makes it difficult for a state that fights this form of terrorism 
to attempt to tackle the ‘root causes’ of the conflict in the shorter run, rather than trying to focus 
the fight against terrorism on the organizations that sponsor suicide missions. Hence, in the short 
run, Israel may have no other choice than to focus its fight against terrorism on the organizations 
that plan and execute suicide attacks. This may help explain Israel’s attempt to ‘destroy the 
terrorist infrastructure’ by staging incursions into Palestinian cities such as during ‘Operation 
Defensive Shield’ of April 2002.  
In the longer run, however, it is unlikely that a military solution to the problem can be 
found as long as Palestinians continue to be highly motivated to volunteer for suicide attacks. 
Hence, a major challenge for Israel in the years to come will be to find ways to make suicide 
bombings less attractive in the eyes of a growing number of Palestinians.   
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Fig. Ia: Suicide Attacks in Israel, Jerusalem, 
and WBGS by Gender, October 2000 - March 2002
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Fig. III: Percentage of Suicide Attacks by Organization, 
October 2000 - March 2002
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Fig. XI: Origin of Attacker, 
October 2000 - March 2002
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Fig. XIV: Suicide Attacks in Israel, Jerusalem, 
and WBGS by Target Type, 
October 2000 - March 2002
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Fig. XVI: Percentage of Suicide Attacks by Region, 
October 2000 - March 2002
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